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JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

Nuclear Smuggling

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PROLIFERATION ISSUES

Nuclear Smuggling

JPRS-TND-94-018

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15 September 1994

[This report contains foreign media information on issues exclusively related to nuclear smuggling.]

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NORTH KOREA

KCNA Denies Financing German Plutonium Smuggler

SK2408113894 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
1105 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] North Korea stated German media reports that a German arrested on a charge of smuggling plutonium received operational funds from North Korea have been fabricated [nalcho].

North Korea's Korean Central News Agency [KCNA] monitored in Tokyo insisted: The report by German media is aimed at deterring efforts to ease tensions over the North Korean nuclear issue. North Korea has already proved its sincerity [chinsilsong] in nuclear negotiations with the United States.

Austrian Article Claims Pyongyang Involved in Plutonium Deals

AU2508152594 Vienna WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE
in German 25 Aug 94 p 22

[Report by Hannes Reichmann: "The Troubles of Mr. Choi"]

[Text] On Monday morning of this week, an inconspicuous limousine with two strikingly bored passengers parked diagonally opposite the house at No. 12, Kaiserstrasse, in Vienna's Neubau district.

For hours, the two men remained in the car, taking turns looking into the rear-view mirror, which was directed at the entrance to a house on the other side of the street. The two men, members of the Interior Ministry's "Anti Terrorist Task Force" (EBT), were observing the "Golden Star Bank-AG," a bank of a different kind.

The background to the discrete interest of the two police agents turns out to be equally unusual. Based on findings of their colleagues from the German Federal Intelligence Service [BND], the EBT is following into a hot trail that originates in a garage in the small Baden-Wuerttemberg city of Tengen-Wiech. In early July, investigators of the Federal Office of Criminal Investigations [BKA] seized 6 grams of plutonium and put the suspected wire-puller, dubious businessman Adolf Jaekle, into the Bavarian Erding prison, where he is awaiting trial.

In his first interrogations, Jaekle only provided confusing information about the men in the background and the real clients. Only when the entire FRG was stricken with terror two weeks ago, after as much as 350 grams of the highly hazardous plutonium 239 were discovered at Munich Airport, things finally also began to move in the Jaekle affair.

The Jaekle Case

The discovery at Munich was arranged by police agents. The "only" thing that still had to be done was to seal the leak from the dubious suppliers—probably somewhere in Russia. The Jaekle case, however, increasingly frightened the BND officers. The idea that meanwhile even small-scale businessmen of the kind of Adolf Jaekle—who has, so far, not been included in any intelligence service files—have access to the purest, weapons-grade plutonium, finally also sounded the alarm of German politicians.

Last Wednesday, the Parliamentary Control Commission met for a secret meeting in Bonn. With facts from CIA colleagues who had travelled to Bonn, a BND specialist presented stunning information: Business documents discovered in the office of Adolf Jaekle indicate that he acquired the plutonium samples on behalf of North Korea. The greatest surprise came from CIA specialists: For the deal with the regime of dictator Kim Yong-il, there is a bank guarantee from the Golden Star Bank in Vienna worth \$100 million, the equivalent of almost 1.2 billion schillings.

After the committee meeting, BND Vice President Paul Muenstermann only vaguely hinted to the new developments in the Jaekle case: "Considering the amounts of money to which Mr. Jaekle had access, one cannot rule out that the clients were foreign states." This, in turn, infuriated Munich lawyer Roland Hasl, who appears for Adolf Jaekle: "I know nothing about the story involving Vienna. In the case of my client, the German and U.S. intelligence services have taken action without informing the state prosecutor."

In the tiny central hall of his bank in 12, Kaiserstrasse, Vienna, Choi Hyok Jin receives all visitors in slippers. Mr. Choi, manager of the Golden Star Bank, personifies a unique concession from the Pyongyang communist regime: The Golden Star is the only North Korean financial institution outside the borders of the People's Republic. As a 100-percent subsidiary of the state-owned Korea Daesong Bank, the institute has made headlines at irregular intervals since it was founded in 1982: At one point, this involved a deal in faked dollars, intended to pay for U.S. securities; then it was gold transactions that lead to a controversy over the degree of purity, or a shady arms deal, involving a former bank employee, who later died under mysterious circumstances.

At first, Mr. Choi cannot relate to the name of Adolf Jaekle. With a friendly smile, he talks about the critical problems of his house on the territory of the class enemy: "We have very friendly ties with Austria. Unfortunately, as a result of our restricted bank concession, we lost a further several hundred thousand schillings in 1993. We are allowed to keep accounts only for Koreans. For the full concession, which we are seeking, we are still 30 million schillings short in original capital."

The Current Account

Considering that last year's balance-sheet total was no more than 500 million schillings, the EBT investigators told their German colleagues that, at first sight, a bank guarantee for more than one billion schillings for Adolf Jaekle appears quite implausible. Yet how much money the North Koreans keep in their correspondent account with the GiroCredit bank in Vienna is not known. German dealer Jaekle, in turn, has meanwhile testified that he had arranged transactions in North Korea involving harmless silver nitrate. So far, it has not been possible to clarify whether these transactions were carried out through the Golden Star Bank in Vienna.

After half an hour, Golden Star head Choi Hyok Jin at least manages to close one gap in his memory: "Last year I received innumerable offers via fax from Germany and Italy for carrying out enormous foreign currency transactions. This probably also included one from Mr. Jaekle."

Mr. Choi, however, regrets that he has already thrown away those papers.

HUNGARY

Stolen Radioactive Materials Ordered by States Supporting 'Terrorism'

LD3108141494 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 0500 GMT 31 Aug 94

[Excerpts]

Announcer: The police have seized two kg of radioactive material. [passage omitted]

Correspondent: [passage omitted] The question as to who could have ordered the radioactive material continues to remain unanswered. Colonel Laszlo Tonhauser, head of the organized crime department of the National Police, said the following:

Tonhauser: The majority of these materials that are stolen from power stations, where they are accessible, are ordered. They are ordered by states that officially cannot trade in these materials and that support terrorism in one form or another, naturally on the state level. Their aim is to acquire, at a later stage, an atomic weapon. [end recording]

SLOVAKIA

Interior Minister Views Country's Role in Nuclear Smuggling

AU3008074994 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 25 Aug 94 p 3

[CTK report: "Slovakia on the Radioactive Route? Interior Minister Pittner on Smuggling of Nuclear Material"]

[Text] Bratislava—Slovak Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner estimates that there are in Central and Eastern Europe more than three kilograms of plutonium that could be used to make a nuclear weapon.

As he told a CTK correspondent yesterday, no cases of trading in radioactive materials had been detected in Slovakia in the past, but information from intelligence sources suggests that Slovakia is on the route, along which this material is being transported to the West. "Yet there is no evidence," Pittner added. He himself subscribes to the opinion that those dangerous substances most probably originate from the countries of the former Soviet Union.

Regarding the detention of four Slovaks and one Czech citizen by the German police in July (they attempted to sell 600 grams of low-enriched uranium and were said to have possessed 0.8 grams of highly enriched uranium 235), the Slovak minister assumes that they were merely offering samples, on the basis of which a larger-scale deal was to be mediated. In view of the ongoing investigations of this case, he refused to provide any more details. He noted, however, that the Slovak authorities have contacted the appropriate agencies of "friendly states" in this matter, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).

Jaroslav Ivor, director of the Slovak Interior Ministry's Office of Investigations, told CTK that two cases of unauthorized manipulation with, and trading in, nuclear material were uncovered in Slovakia in the past. The first case involved a few grams of uranium 235 originating from the Jachymov uranium mines in north Bohemia. "The investigations of both cases have been wound up and the court should now decide on them," Jaroslav Ivor said.

INDIA

Nuclear Smuggling to Pakistan Discussed

MP's Express 'Grave Concern'

BK1908092594 Delhi All India Radio Network in English
0830 GMT 19 Aug 94

[Text] Both houses of Parliament today expressed grave concern at the reported smuggling of weapon-grade plutonium to Pakistan. Members, cutting across party lines, asked the government to take up the issue in all international forums. They also wanted effective steps to meet the security threat posed by the new development.

The issue was raised by Mr. Ramesh Chuniakhala, Congress-I, in the Lok Sabha, and Mr. S. Jaipal Reddy, Janata Dal, in the Rajya Sabha during zero hour. Drawing the attention of the Lok Sabha to the newspaper reports, Mr. Chuniakhala and his party colleagues Mrs. Sribanap Panigrahi and M. Sudhir Savan said the German officials have unearthed positive evidence of plutonium smuggling from Russian sources to Pakistan. One Pakistani national and three others have been arrested. They said after the collapse of the Soviet Union, weapon-grade nuclear material is available more freely and India should take up the matter with Russia.

Germany Asked To Share Information

BK1908145394 Delhi All India Radio Network in English
1430 GMT 19 Aug 94

[Text] India today requested Germany to share information in the investigation into Pakistan's attempt to clandestinely acquire plutonium. This was conveyed to the visiting head of the German delegation to the UN Human Rights Commission and member of parliament, Mr. (Bernard Bonn), in New Delhi. He had a meeting with the minister of state for external affairs, Mr. Salman Khurshid. The request follows German officials unearthing Islamabad's plan to clandestinely transport weapon-grade plutonium from former Soviet Union to Pakistan after arresting a Pakistani and three other men in a raid on Wednesday.

Editorial Views Smuggling Issue

BK2308111094 Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 22 Aug 94 p 6

[Editorial: "The Material for Destruction"]

[Text] The concern expressed in the Lok Sabha about the theft and smuggling of fissile atomic material and Pakistan's involvement in this activity is natural. For the Western countries this issue calls into question the future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), but for India it is a warning of grave danger. The theft and smuggling of about 100 kg of plutonium in unknown areas of the world clearly indicates and the Western intelligence agencies are unable to stop it. If this dangerous material reaches terrorist groups through black market transactions, the terrorism will unleash itself with such macabre consequences that even the superpowers will feel helpless before it. Normally 8 to 10 kg of plutonium is needed to manufacture one ordinary atomic bomb. With current technology, information, and techniques easily available, along

with the help of atomic experts, it is quite possible for a powerful and resourceful terrorist organization to manufacture an atomic bomb.

In the former Soviet Union hundreds of atomic scientists and weapons experts have either been left unemployed or are living in utter poverty because of the skyrocketing inflation there. Many such experts have found jobs in the West, but the sorry living conditions have forced others to indulge in smuggling of information and material concerning the manufacture of atomic weapons. With the adoption of the open market system, Russia is becoming a den of many international criminals, smugglers, and spies. Under these conditions it is likely that the fissile atomic material, equipment, and expertise may become accessible to smugglers. No doubt the apprehension of the outbreak of global war has ended, but with the proliferation of localized regional wars, secessionist and terrorist activities, the world has become much more unstable. Bosnia, West Asia, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Africa, and Sri Lanka are a few such places where not only are terrorism or civil war at their peak, but also where some terrorist organizations are getting regular outside assistance. It is not difficult to guess the instability that might be created if any of these terrorist organizations were to receive nuclear materials or technology.

However, in this generally dangerous situation, India's worry has become graver because of the urgency of the problem. Despite Pakistan's denial, it can be plausibly assumed that Pakistan was involved in the smuggling of plutonium through the Berlin connection. There is a great deal of evidence to prove Pakistan's continued support to the terrorists that are active in Kashmir. She has been supplying arms, money, and training to the terrorists there with special sessions to provide them with knowledge about the use of the latest explosive devices. Hence Indian apprehension has increased that Pakistan might even go to the extent of giving them atomic material to enable them to create havoc in various parts of India.

Blackmailing the administration has always been part and parcel of the terrorists' strategy. With the prospects of an atomic explosion looming large, the terror of this strategy would increase tremendously. The Pakistani ambassador to Germany has said that since Pakistan already possesses the technology to produce an atomic bomb, why would it need to obtain smuggled atomic material? However, this statement itself gives rise to yet another deadly possibility. If Pakistan's atomic program is based on uranium, why would it require plutonium? One possible answer could be that perhaps Pakistan is not satisfied with her present capacity to implement her atomic programs, and this is why it is exploring alternative means. The other and more deadly possibility is that Pakistan is procuring plutonium through smuggling not for herself but to give it to terrorists so that they may help achieve its goal of destabilizing and destroying India with a convincing effect.

PAKISTAN

Allegations of Plutonium Smuggling Viewed

Government 'Categorically' Denies Reports

BK1908121494 Islamabad THE NEWS in English
19 Aug 94 p 1

[Excerpt] Islamabad—Islamabad has regretted the statement made by Berlin officials regarding an alleged plot to smuggle weapons-grade plutonium to Pakistan.

"We note that no arrests have been made and no radioactive material seized yet a 'suspicion' has been voiced," the official spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said.

The spokesman said, "we categorically deny that any agency of the Government of Pakistan has attempted to acquire the plutonium. If the allegations stem from the fact that a Pakistani is amongst those under investigation, it should be noted that Germans and Poles are also cited as being part of the same ring."

"A constant campaign to implicate Pakistan in every clandestine activity related to nuclear matters is obviously directed by quarters with vested interests in maligning Pakistan. We can predict that like other stories this too will disappear after a few days." [passage omitted]

Reports Part of 'Conspiracy To Malign Islamabad'

BK2108130194 Karachi DAWN in English 21 Aug 94 p 20

[Text] Islamabad, Aug 20—Dismissing reports about Pakistan's alleged involvement in procuring weapons-grade plutonium from Germany, a Foreign Office spokesman on Saturday called it a "conspiracy to malign Islamabad."

"We suspect that there is a conspiracy behind this scandal meant to malign Pakistan, it is either a sting job or a wildly concocted story" he told DAWN, adding "we should not give too much credence to such propaganda."

Interestingly, Pakistan appears to have been made the whipping boy by the West, since no proof of Pakistan's involvement in the plutonium scandal has so far emerged. Statements emanating from Washington, Brussels and Bonn from various individual and official quarters have deepened the mystery of the missing plutonium alleged to have been smuggled into Germany from Russia.

Asked whether Pakistan had put in a formal protest to Germany, who had named Pakistan as the possible buyer state for the contraband plutonium without first verifying the facts, the spokesman said: "we are waiting for further information, and once we know on what basis such a frivolous accusation was made, we are certainly going to react." Pakistan does "not appreciate" being named in the plutonium scandal which has caused a wave of comment starting from the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher to the European Union and the NATO members.

The loudest uproar has come from New Delhi, where the Indian Foreign Office and the Parliament are reverberating with accusations against Pakistan's alleged clandestine efforts to obtain the Plutonium 230, used to make nuclear weapons.

Salman Khursheed, Indian Minister of State for External Affairs has tried to deflect and detract the visiting German delegation on UN Commission on Human Rights presently in India on a fact-finding mission on rights abuses in Jammu and Kashmir by telling the delegation leader Gerhard Baum about Pakistan's involvement in procuring the plutonium.

The Foreign Office spokesman said: "Mr Khursheed is showing a red herring to the Germans in order to detract their attention from the massive human rights abuses in

J&K [Jammu and Kashmir], which they have come to investigate."

"We hope Mr Baum does not fall into this trap and instead does a thorough job of investigating the Indian excesses in J&K. The very fact that a German mission is in India for investigations indicate that India has escalated its violence against the innocent Kashmiri people."

Plutonium Sale Story 'Indian Propaganda'

BK2108103794 Islamabad THE NATION in English
21 Aug 94 p 6

[Editorial: "Plutonium Sale Story"]

[Text] The story that an attempt might have been made by a Pakistani agent to obtain plutonium from a German source, has since been debunked, but the fact that it was given currency in the first place, deserves to be noticed. The real story that has come to light is that in order to stop the suspected sale of Russian plutonium in the German underground market, the German intelligence planted a fake buyer as well as a fake seller, who both got nabbed by a third agency which was apparently not aware of the game being played. That agency, assuming that plutonium was not of much use to individuals, surmised that it must be countries engaged in nuclear programme, that were involved. It thought that these could be North Korea, Iraq and Pakistan, but as North Korea and Iraq could get the stuff directly from dealers in Russia, it could only be Pakistan that was doing it. Among those who suddenly got interested in the story were the U.S. and India. The U.S. agents found that the plutonium being offered for sale was not of a weapon grade. Whether this discovery dampened their spirits sufficiently to leave Pakistan alone is not certain, but to the 'holier-than-thou' Indians it was hardly an opportunity they would let pass. Members of the Parliament expressed concern at Pakistan acquiring plutonium and urged the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs to get more details to nail Pakistan. A spokesman of the Indian Foreign Office went on record alleging that Pakistan had been collecting weapon grade nuclear material from abroad for quite some time. This provoked the Indian legislators to demand that the world community be asked to declare Pakistan a terrorist state. And since Pakistan was a terrorist state, India should take counter-measures. And so on and so forth.

This is typical of the way the Indian propaganda machine works. It gets hold of a self-serving story, often complete fiction, and even though it cannot stand the test of legal or moral scrutiny, offers it to the world as gospel truth and then demands of the world not only to believe it but also to support India on it. Take, for example, Narasimha Rao's latest against Pakistan in which he asked the world to accept the Indian claim on Kashmir and condemn Pakistan for its terrorism. The other ingredients of the story that India itself had brought Kashmir to the UN, had agreed to hold a plebiscite there, had not been able to hold an election there for the last four years, had so far on India's own admission, killed ten thousand civilians there and, only a few days back, the Indian Independence Day was observed as a 'black day' in the Occupied Valley, etc, were conveniently left out. For a country as big as India to try to cover up even self-evident truth and to try to make political capital out of complete lies, is amazing.

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RUSSIA

'Secret' Report Criticizes Security at Nuclear Facilities

AU1309121994 Munich FOCUS in German
12 Sep 94 pp 258-260

[Report by Gisbert Mrozek: "Control Problems Have Not Been Solved"]

[Text] Last week, Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry dismissed German press reports about the smuggling of plutonium as "conjecture, lies, and a put-up job." That was on Monday [5 September]. Shortly after that, FOCUS obtained an official document that belies the claims of the Russian nuclear industry agencies and describes how things are covered up.

The document is the official final report prepared by a commission of inquiry set up by the Russian State Nuclear Safety Inspectorate, which had already scrutinized plutonium production at the secret city of Tomsk 7 in the fall of 1993.

The results are shocking, but only available "for official use." There are good reasons for that. The 58-page secret report contains enough to make one's hair stand on end for good reason: "It cannot be ruled out that personnel have built up stocks of nuclear materials that have not been registered.... The problem of uncovering metals, explosives, and radioactive materials at control points has not been solved...."

On 9 April 1993, Boris Yeltsin issued instructions for a very detailed examination of security in the entire Russian nuclear industry complex—three days after a serious nuclear accident at Tomsk 7 that contaminated large areas of Siberia with radioactivity. In October, the commission of inquiry visited Tomsk. On 1 November, Yuriy Subakov, the deputy chairman of the Nuclear Safety Inspectorate, signed the report, of which there are only five copies. They have disappeared into the drawers of the state nuclear mafia.

Speaking with utter conviction during a meeting with Chancellery Minister Bernd Schmidbauer, counterintelligence chief Sergey Stepaschin stated that the circulation of weapons-grade nuclear materials in Russia was watertight.

The opposite is true. In the facilities at Tomsk 7, where plutonium for bombs has been produced since 1954, the doors are wide open for the smuggling of nuclear materials. The secret commission report notes:

- IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] security recommendations are "not always observed and not observed everywhere";
- Weight controls are inaccurate. In the case of uranium hexafluoride containers, the margin of error amounts to 10 kilograms;
- In some cases, there are "no controls at all of actual stocks." Technical control devices are not used. During inventories, only documents are checked;

- The equipment used for sealing does not guarantee that "unsanctioned access to nuclear materials will be uncovered";

- Forty-five blocks of enriched uranium accidentally ended up at a disposal site for technical waste;

Despite special regulations, the plutonium field has not been hermetically sealed off. The commission states expressly that the "norm losses in the case of every technical operation" allow for undetected theft. The removal and transportation of nuclear materials that have been stolen is child's play. The report notes:

- Teams of guards are staffed to between 73 percent and 51.5 percent of their appropriate levels;

- There is no reliable way of uncovering smuggled quantities of radioactive materials at control points;

- Security facilities are outdated and run down;

- The transportation of materials from one plant to another takes place using public roads without any special security measures being taken.

Nevertheless, the commission of inquiry arrives at the conclusion: "In general, regulations are being observed."

Making things appear harmless, covering them up, and hiding them: The Russian nuclear agencies are using all possible means to protect themselves against any kind of criticism. Tomsk 7 is only one example of many.

Lieutenant Yuriy Yefimov delivered a report to leading officers in the Ministry of Internal Affairs: In 1993, there were 900 attempts to enter nuclear industry restricted access areas. On 700 occasions, employees tried remove secret papers. Eleven attempts to remove radioactive material were thwarted. Yefimov did not say anything about the estimated number of undetected cases.

- In August, three youths were apprehended. They wanted to remove nine kilograms of Uranium 238 from the secret nuclear city of Arsamas 16 through a hole in a fence and exchange it for a videorecorder.

- A young businessman kept five kilograms of uranium on his balcony in Arsamas 16.

- In Chelyabinsk 70, three employees of the Nuclear Physics Institute were sentenced for stealing uranium,

- Three officers in the Northern Fleet who stole 4.5 kilograms of uranium were only caught months later by the military security service.

At a Duma commission meeting, the Atomic Energy Ministry complained that delayed and excessively low payments by the Finance Ministry were the cause of the chaos and poverty in the nuclear industry cities. To avoid "catastrophes worse than Chernobyl," the nuclear industry must be a priority for the receipt of payment.

In line with the slogan, your money or your life, the nuclear industry lobby is pressurizing Moscow and the rest of the world. Their only problem is to conjure up nuclear dangers on the one hand while ensuring that its authority is not called into question.

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The offensive German plutonium campaign, explained the Atomic Energy Ministry, only serves to "internationalize controls over Russia's nuclear wealth." Instead of having world organizations interfering in Russia, it would be better to allow Russia access to the world market for nuclear fuels and to share "markets and profits."

Expert Warns of Powerful Plutonium Buyers

AU1908205994 Hamburg DIE WOCHE in German
18 Aug 94 pp 18-19

[Interview with Vladimir Chernosenko, former director of the cleanup at Chernobyl, by Dirk C. Fleck and Olaf Preuss: "Totally Out of Control"]

[Text]

DIE WOCHE: Mr. Chernosenko, in May, 6 grams of weapons-grade plutonium were discovered in a garage near Lake Constance; in June, the Landshut police found one gram of highly enriched uranium 235 with an innkeeper; on 10 August, investigators of the Bavarian Office of Criminal Investigation arrested several people who came from Moscow and had approximately 300 grams of weapons-grade plutonium 239 in their luggage. Does this surprise you?

Chernosenko: Not at all. This is just the tip of the iceberg. Believe me, there is already more weapons-grade nuclear material in your country than you or the authorities can imagine.

DIE WOCHE: How is that possible?

Chernosenko: In the former Soviet Union, huge plutonium stocks were accumulated. A kilogram costs \$150 million on the black market. You can make a lot of money with it.

DIE WOCHE: How do you judge the nuclear elite in Russia and in Ukraine?

Chernosenko: If there is chaos in the country, such a highly sophisticated apparatus cannot work peacefully. Until 1990, the Soviet nuclear industry was the most highly developed in the world. Today, the best people emigrate because they are underpaid. These gaps cannot be closed.

DIE WOCHE: Illegal plutonium trade is flourishing. Is this happening at the criminal level, or is there more behind it?

Chernosenko: One must watch the situation very closely. Up to now, the smuggling has been carried out by the international nuclear mafia. However, if the economic situation in Russia does not improve very soon, which I do not think will happen, then in the future exports of nuclear materials will be carried out secretly by people at the highest rank—on the one hand, as a hard currency source, and on the other, for barter deals.

DIE WOCHE: Who are the potential buyers?

Chernosenko: Armies, energy companies, terrorists—there is a wide range of potential buyers.

DIE WOCHE: This means that virtually everyone—ranging from the criminal to the power-thirsty despot of a small country—can buy whatever he needs on the free market.

Chernosenko: Of course, if he has the necessary money.

DIE WOCHE: How efficiently do international organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, control the nuclear sector?

Chernosenko: The international organizations dealing with the nuclear sector are criminal because, as a rule, their only task is to represent the interests of the nuclear sector. It is a foregone conclusion that only people who are not involved in this industry can control it. This is not guaranteed. It is also a fact that the degree of incompetence increases with the political position.

DIE WOCHE: The American FBI is planning to open an office in Moscow to prevent plutonium smuggling, along with the Russian authorities. So far, this plan has not been carried out. The German Federal Intelligence Service [BND] would like to take part in this cooperation.

Chernosenko: One cannot control plutonium smuggling; that is absurd. Not even the Russians can control it. In Russia, this sector was traditionally controlled by the KGB. Now the structures have collapsed; there is no control any more. A foreign institution is even less in a position to get it under control.

DIE WOCHE: You have lived in Birkenfeld for two years. What contacts do you have with Russia and Ukraine?

Chernosenko: I regularly see my friends who are still holding leading positions in the nuclear industry. All these people have confirmed the danger that emanates from illegal plutonium smuggling.

DIE WOCHE: Have German Government authorities or the energy sector asked you for advice following Chernobyl?

Chernosenko: Your environment minister Toepfer asked me in a talk show in 1992 to advise his ministry, but he quickly forgot it.

DIE WOCHE: You mentioned a "nuclear mafia." What structures does it have?

Chernosenko: Most people do not understand that the nuclear sector and nuclear arms production are closely connected. The so-called peaceful use of nuclear energy was a pretext since the 1950's to advance the military development of nuclear weapons.

DIE WOCHE: You were one of three directors who supervised the cleanup in Chernobyl in 1986 and the construction of the "sarcophagus" under which the highly radioactive ruins of the explosion were to be buried. Now a European consortium of firms will build another sarcophagus around block 4, which was destroyed by the accident. You do not have a high opinion of such an operation. Why not?

Chernosenko: We told the Soviet Government in 1986 that it is useless to build a sarcophagus for the destroyed reactor. One should have closed down and covered the whole facility in Chernobyl. The sarcophagus was only built so that the third block could continue to work. The sarcophagus only served as a partition wall.

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DIE WOCHE: But the nuclear sector claims that the sarcophagus is indispensable for the safety of the people there.

Chernosenko: The first sarcophagus was supposed to hold 30 years. After only two years, it was ruined because it had been built as poorly as the whole reactor. A nuclear power plant will at best hold 30 years. In this period, the movement of the neutrons attacks the construction material so much that it is no longer possible to operate the reactor. The first sarcophagus cost \$5 billion, the second would cost more than \$50 billion. This must be paid by the public, whereas the nuclear sector gets the profits.

DIE WOCHE: So the point is not to protect the people who live in Ukraine and Russia.

Chernosenko: Not at all. What is really dangerous about Chernobyl and all the other nuclear power plants in the former Soviet Union? The danger is that the radioactive waste is not disposed of, but is stored on the premises of the nuclear power plants. All the plutonium waste from the reactors is stored in a sort of warehouse. In the explosion of block 4, approximately six billion Curie were released. In the warehouse, there is approximately three times as much radioactive material, and it is continuously increasing. If such a warehouse explodes, which is possible at any time, the whole world will be exposed to such an intensive radiation that in a few generations, normal life will no longer be possible.

DIE WOCHE: How long will mankind have to live with these time bombs?

Chernosenko: Such a warehouse cannot be secured. That is why the nuclear sector does not even try to give explanations. This must finally be clear. The explosion of a plutonium deposit is a million times more dangerous than the explosion of a reactor. This can happen at any time within the next 100,000 years.

DIE WOCHE: If nuclear waste is so dangerous, would it not be urgently necessary to force reprocessing as long as nuclear power plants are operated?

Chernosenko: Plutonium has a half-life value of 24,500 years. It cannot be influenced or changed in any way.

DIE WOCHE: What you are anticipating for Chernobyl—does this also apply to German interim nuclear waste disposal sites?

Chernosenko: Of course. It is just a matter of good luck that nothing has happened.

DIE WOCHE: Your theses are in drastic contradiction to the statements of energy companies. Does the public have to consider you as a panic-monger?

Chernosenko: The contradiction between the statements of the nuclear sector on the safety of this energy branch and the real danger emanating from it is the moral tragedy of our time. If you look at people suffering from radiation sickness you will know immediately what it means. Until 1945, people with cancer were an exception. In Russia, every other individual is today contaminated with radio-nuclides. In Belarus, after Chernobyl, 15-20 percent of

children are born with deformities. In the next 10 years, 15 million people in Eastern Europe will die of the consequences of Chernobyl.

DIE WOCHE: Even after the Chernobyl accident, you did not want to be considered as an opponent of nuclear power. Today, you are a dedicated warner.

Chernosenko: Since the building of the first reactor (1954) until today, there have been 320 accidents. The public is only aware of three or four particularly dangerous accidents. It does not matter how serious an accident is. In any case, a large quantity of radioactive particles will reach the environment. These particles are hurled into the stratosphere where they may fly around for decades and go down on any territory at any moment. Even properly functioning nuclear power plants continuously release a certain amount of radiation. One cannot protect people from radioactive radiation.

DIE WOCHE: Now the nuclear industry claims that everything is just a matter of safety standards. Therefore, West European energy corporations want to reequip East European reactors.

Chernosenko: The pretense of safety is one of the biggest lies with which the public is being misled. After Chernobyl, the criticism concentrated on the East. It is completely useless to discuss which technology is the better one. Nuclear energy is not safe anywhere, neither in the East nor in the West.

DIE WOCHE: Ukraine produces as much nuclear energy now as in 1986. The Ukrainian nuclear program is even to be expanded. Are the Western energy corporations trying to influence the Russian or Ukrainian authorities for their own benefit?

Chernosenko: I believe that one need not prove that anymore....

DIE WOCHE: You call for the immediate worldwide opting out of nuclear energy?

Chernosenko: If we want to survive, yes.

DIE WOCHE: The danger that is posed by radioactive waste would still remain in existence....

Chernosenko: Today we have, figuratively speaking, a bucket full of waste. If we continue as in the past, we will soon have tonnes of it.

DIE WOCHE: Despite growing public resistance, the accident in Chernobyl has not hampered the unchecked expansion of the nuclear industry.

Chernosenko: At the beginning, I thought that we had learned. However, when I see what is going on now, I think that something is not quite right with our brains. We are talking about secondary problems, like the ozone hole or water pollution—this is absurd if one thinks how much profit the nuclear industry is still making.

DIE WOCHE: Which personal danger are you facing as an insider and competent informer?

Chernosenko: Anyone who tells the truth about nuclear energy today is risking much. This industrial branch does

not stand up to any criticism. In the former Soviet Union, several people who wanted to give information against nuclear energy have already disappeared inexplicably.

Official Says Germany Not Presented Documents on Smuggling

*LD1908205994 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1823 GMT 19 Aug 94*

[Text] A representative of the Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service said that, as far as he knows, German official representatives have yet to hand over any documents on the incident in Munich where three passengers on a flight from Moscow were detained recently with nuclear materials.

Deputy Chief of Public Relations Center of the Federal Counterintelligence Service Vladimir Tomarovskiy told Interfax today that Russia is interested in a thorough investigation of this incident.

According to the German media the several hundred grams of weapon-grade plutonium seized from the passenger were likely stolen from a Russian nuclear facility.

Tomarovskiy stressed that these accusations remain baseless as there is no documentary evidence proving that the plutonium had come from Russia. He considered it necessary to approach this problem in a civilized way without unfounded accusations.

"Let's wait and see what Mister Schmidbauer (state minister in German federal chancellor's staff on coordinating activities of the special services - IF) will have with him when he arrives in Moscow on Saturday," Tomarovskiy said.

Tomarovskiy added that "at the meeting with Schmidbauer we are ready to seriously and properly discuss the issues of preventing radioactive materials from being stolen and cooperation between the Russian and German special services in this sphere."

Atomic Energy Official Views Plutonium Smuggling Issue

*LD1908164594 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian
1000 GMT 19 Aug 94*

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Our correspondent linked up by telephone with Georgiy Kurov, head of the information department of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry: [begin recording]

Kurov: We believe that the hullabaloo aroused by the Federal Republic of Germany over the weapons-grade plutonium has some kind of political idea behind it. The fact is that the accusations that this is Russian plutonium are completely groundless, and the Germans have not obtained any proof—or they have not presented it.

Now, as far as the aircraft is concerned, the aircraft flew from Germany and arrived in Moscow. The passengers were received here, and the plane flew back to Germany. This plane was met by the police there. They had already been tipped off that this plutonium was there. It smacks merely of a provocation, and that is all.

Now, according to our information, the Germans presented an analysis of this material to the United States, and the data produced by experts at the Los Alamos Laboratory shows that this was not weapons-grade plutonium, and this was not Russian plutonium. This is stated directly by specialists of the United States.

Unidentified correspondent: A delegation of specialists has arrived in our country from the FRG, and they have irrefutable proof in their hands that this radioactive substance belongs to Russia.

Kurov: Of course, these specialists from the Federal Republic, when they have been making noises about this material being Russian, they have got themselves into a hole. Of course, they will try to get out of this situation somehow. Our ministry is a technical ministry, which does not easily believe slogans. Let us have your proof. Give us this substance, and we will analyze it. Then we will tell you. The Germans, however, do not give us anything. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Atomic Energy Ministry Ready for Talks on Confiscated Materials

*LD1908170094 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1552 GMT 19 Aug 94*

[Text] The reports on nuclear materials confiscated in Germany available to the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry do not reveal the Russian origin of those materials. First Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Lev Ryabev told Interfax Friday.

Ryabev said officials of his ministry would take part in talks with a German delegation headed by the state minister for coordinating the activities of special services in the federal chancellor's staff, Bernd Schmidbauer. The talks are scheduled to be held in Moscow this Saturday.

"We are ready for a normal dialogue on this issue with all interested states," Ryabev emphasized. He said that most importantly, Germany must provide Russia with full information about the nuclear materials they have uncovered.

Ryabev pointed out that only fragmentary reports had been coming from Germany on the plutonium consignment confiscated. In his opinion, "behind the press reports of alleged repeated attempts to smuggle out uranium and plutonium there is a certain political twist."

SRV Says Origin of Smuggled Plutonium Still To Be Proven

*LD1908143294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1035 GMT 19 Aug 94*

[Article by ITAR-TASS correspondent Olga Semonova]

[Text] Moscow August 19 TASS—The accusations that the plutonium 239 recently discovered on a Lufthansa airliner in Germany was smuggled out of Russia through Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport have yet to be proved. Such proof can be presented only after thoroughly analysing the radioactive material and the clues which the German side is able

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to provide, according to Tatyana Samolis, spokeswoman for the director of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).

The SVR is upset by the propaganda campaign in the Western press to accuse Russia of being unable to ensure reliable control over its nuclear materials. Russian origin was never proved in even one of the earlier cases involving the leak of radioactive materials, Samolis told ITAR-TASS on Friday.

"As far as we know, in the past there have been leaks of radioactive nuclear materials from strategic enterprises in Western countries", the SVR spokeswoman said. However, she did not categorically deny the possibility of such a thing happening in Russia. "The possibility of a leak of radioactive materials exists in any country, and ours is not an exception. That is why it is necessary to undertake world-wide efforts to solve that problem", Samolis stated.

According to the press secretary, one of the SVR's main tasks is to investigate information about the illegal trade in nuclear materials and weapons of mass destruction. Recently, intelligence services around the world have begun establishing a certain amount of cooperation in that sphere, since the "problem poses a threat to all humanity", she said.

Kurchatov Institute Denies Losing Any Plutonium

LD1908091194 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0813 GMT 19 Aug 94

[Article by ITAR-TASS correspondent Anna Bakina]

[Text] Moscow, 19 Aug (ITAR-TASS)—The Kurchatov Institute, one of Russia's scientific centers, keeps a small quantity of fuel-grade plutonium (that is, not weapons-grade) for research purposes, but there is absolutely no information to suggest any is missing. This was stated in an interview with ITAR-TASS by Andrey Gagarinskiy, the institute's director for external activities, when asked to comment on the scandal over the plutonium discovered in a Lufthansa aircraft.

He said that in view of the situation the institute is now carrying out a serious, unscheduled check on all its stocks of radioactive material, which will take many weeks.

The last inventory to be carried out showed that stocks of radioactive materials "had not fallen by a single gram."

Official Criticizes Media over Nuclear Smuggling Reporting

LD2008205294 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1449 GMT 20 Aug 94

["If the arguments are weak then any other means will do - intelligence man on 'new reports' of nuclear smuggling"—ITAR-TASS headline; by ITAR-TASS correspondent Olga Semenova]

[Text] Moscow, 20 Aug—People without enough evidence to prove their point will resort to any other means, one of the participants in today's talks at the Federal Counterintelligence Service told ITAR-TASS. He had been asked why someone had to report today that another "certain quantity of lithium-6" had been confiscated from nuclear

materials smugglers at Munich Airport, on the day that talks began between Russia and Germany on settling the "plutonium incident."

The western press immediately pounced on this news, and without any proof whatsoever presented it as yet more serious evidence that Russia is incapable of keeping an eye on its "deadly isotopes." According to the counterintelligence representative, Germany raised the fact that the lithium-6 was seized, together with the plutonium-239, from the same traffickers, but without trying to blame us for leaking it. Also, it is unknown if this was metallic lithium, whose isotope is used in the development of thermonuclear weapons, and can significantly raise the yield of "conventional" nuclear weapons.

According to opinions given backstage at the talks by other special service people from both countries, it is a great pity that the media, apparently ignorant of the full import of the nuclear smuggling issue, often wrongly and hastily interpret incoming reports, and subsequently feed misleading information to the public.

Intelligence Official Terms Plutonium Issue German 'Propaganda'

BR2208113094 Paris LE POINT in French 20 Aug 94 p 11

[Interview with Vladimir Tomarovskiy, member of the Russian Federal Service for Counterespionage, by Virginie Coulloudon in Moscow, date not given: "Propaganda Operation"]

[Text]

Coulloudon: How do you explain Moscow's categorical denial of the announcement that the plutonium seized in Germany is probably of Russian origin?

Tomarovskiy: You are emphasizing it yourself, it is "probably" of Russian origin. Today, there is no evidence of plutonium smuggling in Russia. Our services did not discover any such traffic and, what is more, Germany has made it a fait accompli. We did not receive any information via official channels. We were informed of Germany's suspicions via the press. Thus, nothing makes us believe that these accusations are founded. The attitude of the German authorities is propaganda pure and simple.

Coulloudon: Why do you think that Germany has an interest in orchestrating a campaign against Moscow?

Tomarovskiy: To put pressure on Boris Yeltsin on the eve of his visit to Bonn, to convince public opinion that we are not capable of controlling our nuclear industry, or even to weaken the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry, or to win a contract... There are many hypotheses. But it clearly is a propaganda operation, because we have had no contact with our [German] counterparts.

Coulloudon: Nevertheless, Western fears are based on real facts. The plutonium came from Moscow!

Tomarovskiy: Obviously, we are not going to declare that a theft of radioactive substances cannot occur in Russia. But we do maintain that there has been no leak recently. We checked all our storehouses: Not one gram of fissionable material was found to be missing. We do not deny that

there are weak spots in Russia. The theft of radioactive substances is a more general problem affecting us all, Russians as well as Europeans. We are willing to cooperate at the international level against this scourge. But to do this, we have to unite our forces, and not attack one another.

Expert Says Illegal Trade in Nuclear Materials 'Very Great'

*LD2308092894 Berlin DDP/ADN in German
0453 GMT 23 Aug 94*

[Text] Cologne (DDP/ADN)—In the view of Russian nuclear expert Vladimir Kuznetsov there are considerable security loopholes in the Russian nuclear industry. The security system is far from perfect, Kuznetsov said on ARD television's "Morgenmagazin" today. There is also a lack of laws about nuclear power and cooperation with international organizations.

According to Kuznetsov, the scale of illegal trade in nuclear materials is "very" great. No one can say how much is actually in circulation. If you want to, you can obtain the material by illegal means. Kuznetsov does not rule out that Russian nuclear scientists, some of whom receive only \$7 a month in pay, are involved in the smuggling. However, he is optimistic that the smuggling problem can be brought under control in cooperation with the West.

Counterintelligence Chief Heads Nuclear Monitoring Body

*LD2308221594 Moscow Ostankino Television First
Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 23 Aug 94*

[Video report by correspondent Andrey Murtazin, including recording of remarks by Sergey Stepashin, director of Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service—from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text]

Announcer: Sergey Stepashin, director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service, visited Kaluga and Obninsk today. This trip is directly connected with the visit to Moscow by Bernard Schmidbauer, German state minister. Sergey Stepashin was accompanied on his trip by our special correspondent Andrey Murtazin.

Murtazin: As is known, the three days of talks on the problem of smuggling nuclear material resulted in the Russian-German memorandum in which the sides agreed to expand cooperation on this matter. [video shows Stepashin getting out of car, speaking to journalists]

Stepashin: Schmidbauer and I appeal to other countries, both those which have a nuclear potential and those which do not, to create international guarantees for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a whole range of radioactive materials. It is not just a matter of plutonium, not just about the components of nuclear weapons, but of radioactive elements in general.

Murtazin: After the recent incident in Munich, the Russian president ordered the setting up of a commission to monitor the non-proliferation of radioactive elements and

nuclear weapons, and this commission is now headed by the director of Russian Counterintelligence. [video shows Stepashin touring a nuclear facility]

In Obninsk Sergey Stepashin went to the Physics and Energy Institute where the world's first industrial nuclear reactor was put into operation 40 years ago. It is now closed down and its radioactive elements are under reliable guard. In order to reach the storage facility it is necessary to go through another three doors like this one. It is impossible to bring anything out of here unnoticed—the alarm system would sound immediately. Similar monitoring systems exist at all other Russian nuclear facilities.

The results of the expert study of the isotopes taken to Germany will be announced in six to eight weeks but Russian officials are already reaffirming that there is no leakage of radioactive materials from our enterprises and there has not been any.

Kurchatov Center Inspection 'Shows Nothing is Missing'

*LD2308180394 Moscow NTV in Russian
1500 GMT 23 Aug 94*

[Video report by Yelena Masyuk]

[Text] New reports are appearing in Moscow on the radioactive substance detained at Munich airport which, some reports allege, was manufactured in the Moscow Kurchatov center. This was denied at a news conference today. A representative of this world-famous nuclear center said that following various allegations by foreign representatives, the institute has carried out an urgent inspection of the plutonium and the uranium stored in the center. This shows that nothing is missing.

Academician Ponomarev-Stepnoy, vice president of the Kurchatov center, also cited today the factual evidence used by the German side to put forward his version of the events.

The man who was detained at the German airport with the dangerous substance also possessed two business cards of leading experts of the Kurchatov center. Moscow does not regard this as ominous. Staff members of the institute are not banned from contacts with foreigners.

As for the confiscated substance itself, the exact results of the examination are not yet known. It is known, however, that the vial that went from Moscow to Munich contained a mixture of plutonium and uranium. This mixture is called (MOX). The price of one gram of this mixture is \$20. The vial contained 6 grams. In other words, the market price of the vial detained at Munich airport is \$120.

Mr. Ponomarev-Stepnoy also cited International Atomic Energy Agency international rules according to which containers with less than 15 grams of uranium are not considered in international practice at all. According to him, the (MOX) technological mixture is not manufactured in Russia industrially, although its manufacture in a laboratory is possible.

Therefore, precise information on the chemical and physical contents of the vial confiscated at Munich airport is

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not yet available. The German side is conducting the investigation. The president of the Russian Federation and the German chancellor will learn the results of the examination before anybody else.

It is strange that Germany is inciting the masses on the issue of the illegal exports of radioactive substances, the vice president of the Kurchatov center said in an exclusive interview with NTV. He thinks there are two reasons behind this: [begin recording]

Ponomarev-Stepnoy: There is practical interest and political interest. [end recording] [video shows news conference in Kurchatov Institute, capsules in a container, and interview with official]

Scientist Says Munich Plutonium Non-Russian

LD2308173294 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1556 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] The nuclear fuel confiscated in Munich cannot be used for making nuclear weapons and was produced outside Russia, the vice president of the leading Russian nuclear center—the Kurchatov Institute—told a news conference in Moscow on Tuesday.

Nikolay Ponomarev-Stepnoy said he fails to see why anyone would steal or smuggle a substance only used as fuel for nuclear reactors and costing a mere \$20 per gram. He said this mixture of oxides of plutonium and uranium is used in France, Germany and Belgium.

Ponomarev-Stepnoy said Russia is only taking the first steps towards using this kind of fuel and has not built a single plant producing it. He believes learning what country the fuel is from should not prove difficult. "This is comparable to identifying fingerprints," he said.

Ponomarev-Stepnoy said that on the basis of the data supplied by "competent bodies" he has already managed to establish the country that manufactured the plutonium, but refused to name it, while stressing that the fuel was not made in Russia.

The scientist was surprised that the smuggling of nuclear materials is reported only by Germany. Earlier Germany kicked up a storm over so-called red quicksilver, now it is fanning hysteria over plutonium, he said.

Theft of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Dismissed as Impossible

LD2408133594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1147 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Article by ITAR-TASS correspondent Yurk Khots]

[Text] Krasnoyarsk August 24 TASS—Yuriy Volzhanin, chief engineer of the Krasnoyarsk mining and chemical complex, has flatly denied the possibility of thefts of weapons-grade plutonium from his enterprise. "The production cycle of plutonium-239 at our enterprise practically rules out the possibility of even one gramme of it escaping from our field of vision," he told ITAR-TASS.

"We use natural metallic uranium as the raw material, special blocks of which are loaded into the reactor, and not a single person sees it after that," the engineer noted.

"After the uranium turns into plutonium, these blocks are moved to a neighbouring plant through special hydraulic transportation systems," he added.

"At no stage of the technological process can anybody steal the plutonium from the enterprise, because this will be immediately recorded by instruments," Volzhanin stressed.

Theft of Uranium-238 From Aramzas-16 Nuclear Center Reported

Two Detained

LD2408084494 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0824 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Article by ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 24 Aug—Two unemployed people who stole 9.5 kg of uranium-238 from Russia's Arzamas-16 closed nuclear center have been detained by the Federal Counterintelligence Service in a joint operation with the Russian Federation Interior Ministry and the Arzamas-16 internal affairs department. The nuclear fuel was confiscated and an investigation started.

The Russian Interior Ministry told an ITAR-TASS correspondent today that the operation to detain those responsible for stealing the fissionable material was successfully carried out on 20 August.

More Details on Identity of Thieves

LD2408142094 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian
1315 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Mayak correspondent Anatoliy Fedorov reported that the department of the Russian Interior Ministry responsible for guarding special facilities, including nuclear facilities, was involved in the operation to detain two criminals found with uranium from the Arzamas-16 works.

He gave the following details about the detainees and their crime: [begin recording]

Fedorov: Their names are now known—a certain Demenyankin, born 1961, president of the Aleks joint stock company; and the second man, born in 1962, was a certain Vasin. He really was unemployed. And they found these riches—and they are great riches since one gram of uranium is worth anything from one million dollars upwards on the open market—they found these riches in a garage, a private garage. Another detail I would like to tell the Mayak listeners—these boys' parents were directly involved in the production of uranium-238. In any case, an investigation is now under way. [end recording]

Stolen Uranium 'Not Suitable' For Bomb Making

LD2408101794 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0945 GMT 24 Aug 94

[ITAR-TASS correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

[Text] Moscow, 24 Aug (ITAR-TASS)—The 9.5 kg of stolen uranium-238 which the Russian Interior Ministry informed ITAR-TASS about today is not suitable for the

production of nuclear weapons. It is only fissionable in fast breeder reactors and so can only be used for nuclear power, the ITAR-TASS correspondent was told at the "Rosenergoatom" concern.

Nuclear power station fuel is made up of 96 percent uranium-238 and three-four percent uranium-235. One fuel cartridge for a reactor weighs 150 kgs. Around 60 metric tonnes of fuel are needed to load a water-cooled power reactor, for example. So specialists are finding it difficult to explain why such an insignificant amount of uranium-238 was stolen.

They also stressed that a number of special organizations officially trade in uranium-238. These include "Tekhsnabekspost" in Russia. One kg of the material costs around \$100-200 here.

Stolen Uranium 'Useless'

LD2508142894 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1340 GMT 25 Aug 94

[Text] The 9.5 kilos of uranium-238 confiscated by the Federal Counterintelligence Service last Saturday represents the low-concentration natural uranium waste from which the weapons-grade uranium-233 and 235 had already been extracted.

The 9.5 kilos are "useless"; they take the form of a large chunk of metal of high density used by technologically advanced countries to manufacture artillery shells, the deputy director of the Federal Nuclear Center (Arzamas-16), Yuriy Yakimov, told Interfax.

According to him, the stolen uranium "presents no danger in terms of radioactivity", its radiation level is "extremely low", and the chunk could be dangerous "only if it is held with bare hands for a long time."

Yakimov "would like to assure the world public and news media" that security requirements in the guarding of weapons-grade uranium are "much stricter". He said that last year local guard units conducted special exercises, and the Vympel Group from Russia's Interior Ministry, whose members took part in the exercises, "gave a high assessment of the procedure for storing and guarding nuclear materials adopted by the federal center."

The report on the robbery of uranium from Arzamas-16 broadcast on Wednesday "caused great political damage to our state," Yakimov stated. He believes that a federal program should be adopted to strengthen dosimetric control at the relevant agencies.

Plutonium Smuggling Row Leaves Many Unanswered Questions

944F1407A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Aug 94 p 1

[Article by Andrey Vaganov: "Consensus Reached in the Nuclear Smuggling Case: But This Does Not Mean That This Puts an End to the Plutonium Row"]

[Text] It would seem that the speculative wave of interest in the problem of the illegal transit of fissionable material is destined to subside without having satisfied the public interest in full. Here is a concise chronology of events.

A container of some radioactive substance was confiscated on 10 August at Munich Airport from a citizen of Colombia who had arrived by plane from Russia. The scenario of "Russian radioactive footprints" began immediately to be unwound in the Western press: Among the 3,000 business cards found on the Colombian, there are two that belong to employees of the Kurchatov Institute Russian Research Center. Figures were cited initially that for specialists in the field of nuclear engineering sounded simply fantastic—hundreds of grams of weapons-grade plutonium-239. The German side demands that Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation, take charge of the problem personally. Urgent preparations for a visit to Russia by Bernd Schmidbauer, coordinator of Germany's special services, begin simultaneously. As far as we can tell, Herr Schmidbauer was until the last moment expecting a meeting with the president of the Russian Federation, and no lower, which caused ill-concealed irritation on the part of his Russian colleagues. They, representatives of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation and the leadership of the Kurchatov Institute Russian Research Center, immediately and categorically rejected the version of the Russian origin of the confiscated plutonium and demanded that samples of it be made available for analysis by Russian specialists. But instead of samples, Bernd Schmidbauer, who arrived in Moscow last Saturday on a three-day visit, brought only the findings of German experts on the results of the spectrum analyses that they had conducted. Be that as it may, on Monday, 22 August, Sergey Stepashin, director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service of the Russian Federation, and Herr Schmidbauer signed a joint memorandum on the results of the visit. It was learned yesterday that Boris Yeltsin and Helmut Kohl had been familiarized with the memorandum and had approved it.

The signing of this document should, it might have seemed, have dotted all the "i's" in the plutonium row. But merely the fact that the quantity of the confiscated substance constitutes six grams and that this is not weapons-grade plutonium but the so-called MOX fuel—a mixture of uranium oxides and plutonium used as nuclear power station fuel—has been established more or less accurately. There are no plants in Russia that produce MOX fuel. "Clearly, this material was not used at any of the nuclear facilities of Russia," Yevgeniy Makerin, director of a department of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, emphasized after the signing.

But Academician Nikolay Ponomarev-Stepnoy, vice president of the Kurchatov Institute Russian Research Center, for example, declared at a news conference that he possessed no official information on the results of Bernd Schmidbauer's visit. "I derive my entire information connected with the substance confiscated in Munich from the press. The Russian Research Center has no analytical data. But competent authorities told me by telephone that the analyses were such and such." It is odd that there was not a single representative of the Kurchatov Institute Russian Research Center at the Russian-German negotiations. As far as the employees of the institute whose cards were found on the Colombian are concerned, they belong,

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according to Ponomarev-Stepnoy, to two leading specialists of the Russian Research Center in the field of chemistry and physical methods of work with fissile material. There are no complaints about them, and they themselves do not recall having given their cards to any Colombian subject (the Russian Research Center has up to 2,500 foreign visitors a year; approximately 1,000 of the institute staff travel overseas every year).

Once again it follows from what the academician said that MOX fuel is as much an individual thing as fingerprints. Establishing this country or the other's ownership of this substance would constitute no difficulty were the results of the analyses to be compared with the known conditions of Russian plutonium. The German experts cannot do this simply because these are secret data. At the same time, on the other hand, the parties agree in the signed memorandum that the analyses of the radioactive substance confiscated in Munich should be conducted in the FRG ("...the confiscated material will be analyzed in the laboratory of the country on whose territory this material is found," the memorandum says). The situation is reminiscent of a silent compromise: The Russian side entrusts the analyses to the Germans, but there will be nothing with which to compare their results. As Aleksandr Mikhaylov, chief of the Federal Counterintelligence Service Public Relations Center, declared at a briefing held yesterday, "the purpose of the memorandum is to answer the question of what is to be done, not the question of who is to blame."

Certain other questions remain unanswered also. Why have all the instances of the smuggling of radioactive materials been recorded only in the FRG (the other nuclear countries are relatively indifferent to these incidents)? If there was, indeed, a smuggling attempt, who was its ultimate client? All the checks carried out in the Kurchatov Institute Russian Research Center in terms of the recording, supervision, and physical protection of fissionable materials have shown the absence of losses and of the unsanctioned use or theft of these materials. At the same time, on the other hand, according to official IAEA standards, a quantity of plutonium of less than 15 grams is not recorded at all (six grams, I would recall, were confiscated from the Colombian in Munich). Thus the plutonium row will, it would seem, supplement the already rich collection of unsolved riddles of the century.

Murmansk Official Confirms Theft of Radioactive Material

*BR2508091994 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian
25 Aug 94 p 11*

[Interview with Yuriy Berger, "deputy governor of Murmansk region," by Carlo Pizzati in Murmansk; date not given: "Murmansk, Nuclear Graveyard, Paradise for Plutonium Thieves"—first two paragraphs are LA REPUBBLICA introduction]

[Excerpt] Murmansk—[passage omitted on recent plutonium seizures] Here in Murmansk, a city of 500,000 inhabitants 320 km north of the Arctic circle, facing the Barents Sea, there are plenty of nuclear submarines. During the Cold War this is where the USSR maintained the most powerful fleet in the world. Now Russia has

almost 150 of them, and at least 80 are anchored at the various bases on the Kola peninsula. According to scientists in neighboring Norway, there are also 60 disused submarines in a dangerous condition, 40 of which still have their reactors on board. And in view of the current economic crisis, there could be many temptations.

In order to attract people to a city where winter starts in September and ends in July, the Kremlin used to offer workers free vacations every three years. Now there is no heating or hot water from June through September: There is no longer the money for it. It is likely therefore that people would allow themselves to be corrupted, by selling plutonium in order to permit themselves a few luxuries. We interviewed the deputy governor of Murmansk region, Yuriy Berger.

Pizzati: According to Sergey Novikov, deputy director of Gosatomnadzor, the Russian agency that monitors nuclear activities, the theft of radioactive material "is fairly common in Russia." Is this true here too?

Berger: It has not so far been proved that the plutonium found in Germany came from Russian territory, nor has it been proved that it came from a Russian submarine. In my opinion, that filth, radioactive material, is stored in places much more secure than the safes where our money is kept.

Pizzati: But some people might allow themselves to be tempted, in view of the economic crisis that is hitting this region, too.

Berger: We have had only one theft of radioactive material. It happened a few months ago, when two Navy officers smuggled material out of a military base. But they were under constant surveillance by our spies. The two desperately sought a buyer, and when it became obvious, after two months, that nobody would come forward, we had them arrested.

Pizzati: But organized crime in Russia could increase this kind of activity; somebody could corrupt other officials.

Berger: The crime situation is complicated. As long as Saddam remains in power in Iraq there will always be attempts at theft. We cannot guarantee 100 percent that there will be no thefts. People want to improve their living standards, and nobody can prevent an official from stealing radioactive material—apart from another, honest, official. One solution would be to have even stricter security measures. But the human factor would remain, nevertheless.

Pizzati: Do you intend to ask President Yeltsin to give you part of the \$100 million that the European Union and the United States recently promised Russia in order to improve nuclear security?

Berger: During the three years of perestroika we have heard about offers of \$1, 2, 5 billion that the United States and the European Union are supposed to have promised us. But the only nation that has really helped us with funding and machinery to monitor radioactive material is Norway.

Pizzati: Have you ever arrested people who were trying to steal plutonium or radioactive material in this area?

Berger: No. But I will tell you something. I am willing to pay you a few dollars, and you can try for yourself. I do not think you will have much luck. Here so far we have arrested only African traffickers trying to take drugs to Europe.

Ex-KGB Official Says Plutonium Affair 'Covert Action' by West

*AU2508122394 Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 24 Aug 94 p 3*

[Interview with former KGB official Leonid Shebarshin by Irina Wolkowa; place and date not given: "West Wants Control of Russia's Nuclear Potential"]

[Text] Leonid Shebarshin was born in 1935. In 1953 he started working in the KGB's main section (foreign counterintelligence), whose chief he was from January 1989 to September 1991. Since 1992, Shebarshin has been president of the "Foundation for Economic Security in Russia."

Wolkowa: The plutonium scandal hit right in the middle of the slack summer season. Can the hot scent that intelligence services are following now be traced back to the time when you were chief of the KGB's foreign department?

Shebarshin: Before the collapse of the Soviet Union there was no indication of fissionable material being smuggled abroad. I can clearly rule that out as all nuclear objects on the territory of the USSR were under KGB control, whose deputy chief I was as head of the foreign department. Of course, we dealt with the problem on a theoretical level. In our practical work we even rehearsed possible smuggling scenarios and their prevention.

Wolkowa: Why?

Shebarshin: We just had to assume that fissionable material might be of interest to terrorist groups. It is no coincidence that a new literary genre turned up in the 1980's—the nuclear thriller....

Wolkowa: ... which might long have been surpassed by Russian reality.

Shebarshin: As far as I know, these are only speculations of the media. The origin of the plutonium that was found in Germany has not been established. And there are not even any clear indications that the material in question is suitable for weapons production.

Wolkowa: Russian media say that the reports on the plutonium scandal have been exaggerated deliberately, because the West is smelling big business, should Russia be forced to buy measuring and control equipment abroad.

Shebarshin: There are far larger sums involved in the current campaign: Our nuclear potential is to be put under Western control, under U.S. responsibility. From my experience I know that with complex plans like that intelligence services resort to what is called active measures—or covert action, as my American colleagues would say. The plutonium affair is a perfect example for that.

Wolkowa: Could you explain this strategy in more detail to us laymen?

Shebarshin: In our specific case, in early 1992 a Tunisian paper wrote that Kazakhstan had sold two nuclear warheads to Iran. A French paper took it up immediately; others, including several Russian papers, took it up quite uncritically. Examinations showed that the report was a hoax. But public opinion had been put on alert, and thus further measures could be taken. There have been reports, for instance, about Russian nuclear scientists emigrating to Iran, Iraq, or Libya. I offered to my former colleagues in the Western intelligence services that I would try to find out where Russian nuclear scientists are going. So far, there has been no reply, since they know just as well as I do that they are going to the United States, Israel, and Great Britain. Corrections, if they are published at all, appear in small print, so that the reports can take effect in peace; and gradually the desired aim comes within reach. I already warned of such developments back in early 1992. Unfortunately, hardly anyone took it seriously then. Only former Security Minister Barannikov reported to the Chamber of Deputies in a confidential meeting last year that intelligence and counterintelligence had noted increased activities by the West to gain an influence on Russia's nuclear potential.

Wolkowa: Does that make sense politically?

Shebarshin: Yes. Russia is to be demolished as a superpower. As the only remaining great-power feature, our nuclear potential must be put under international control. Partnership does not seem to extend to nuclear equality.

Wolkowa: The campaign, as you call the plutonium scandal, seems to have reached its climax now. Is that just a coincidence, or is there more to it?

Shebarshin: Any strategic, and thus long-term, operation depends on its objective basis. Attempts to put the Russian nuclear potential under Western control only stand a slight chance of succeeding due to the current political instability and our economic weakness. That means there is a very limited time span available. What was impossible before 1991 will be a thing of the past again in 1995, or 1996 at the latest.

Wolkowa: Can the plutonium affair affect Russia's domestic-policy situation?

Shebarshin: If Russia were to yield to the conditions of the West, this would have the most serious effects on the inner balance of our society. That knowledge should prevent our government from taking any foolish actions.

Mikhaylov's Remarks at Briefing on Nuclear Smuggling

*MM2508114194 Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA
GAZETA in Russian 25 Aug 94 p 1*

[INTERFAX report: "Main World Event: Case of Half Kilogram of Plutonium Ends in Stepashin-Schmidbauer Memorandum"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The results of spectrum analysis provide almost unequivocal evidence that Russia has nothing to do with the smuggled nuclear materials found on German territory, Aleksandr Mikhaylov, head of the

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Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS] Public Relations Center, said during a briefing in Moscow Wednesday [24 August].

He explained that he used the words "almost unequivocal" because "during the conversation between FCS Director Sergey Stepashin and Bernd Schmidbauer, state minister in the German federal chancellor's department, the sides made no attempt to enter into accusations."

A. Mikhaylov stressed that the meeting between Stepashin and Schmidbauer "took place on the initiative and at the request of the German side." Prior to this meeting, A. Mikhaylov said, the Russian side did not receive any materials connected with the discovery of the isotopes on German territory 10 August.

According to A. Mikhaylov, the German side submitted material from the spectrum analysis and material on the people involved in the smuggling.

Commenting at INTERFAX's request on the ballyhoo in the German mass media over leaks of radioactive substances from Russia, the FCS spokesman noted that, like it or not, such campaigns give the appearance that there is a market in Germany for these radioactive materials. He also pointed out that, in experts' opinion, the current situation is linked "with a desire to obtain access to nuclear facilities and monitor [vzyat pod kontrol] of Russia's nuclear weapons as a whole." A. Mikhaylov thinks that one of the aims of the campaign of accusations leveled at Russia was to depict it as an unreliable partner and bar the way to the world market for our radioactive materials.

Minister Churkin on Nuclear Smuggling, Controls
MM3008160294 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish
26 Aug 94 p 6

[Interview with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin by Miguel Jimenez in Santander; date not given; first paragraph is EL PAIS introduction]

[Excerpt] Santander—Vitaliy Churkin, at 42 years of age, denies being an ambitious politician, but, it is said, he did his utmost to avoid being appointed Russian ambassador to Chile and to be able to continue his career in Moscow. This week he took part in a Menendez Pelayo International University course in Santander on "The Balkan Conflict and Eastern Europe's Democratic Integration." Churkin was the diplomat chosen by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to mediate in the conflict devastating the former Yugoslavia. He is less eager to talk about plutonium trafficking, since he claims not to be thoroughly acquainted with the problem.

Jimenez: Can Russia guarantee that there has been no trafficking in its nuclear material?

Churkin: I believe that nobody can give a 100 percent guarantee. Thefts of military secrets occur everywhere. Nobody can guarantee that there is no theft.

Jimenez: But it seems that in Russia the guarantees are now minimal.

Churkin: We are interested in cooperating closely with all parties interested in preventing illegal plutonium trafficking, but before pointing the finger at anybody, what is said must be proved.

Jimenez: But the plutonium seized in Munich arrived on a flight from Moscow.

Churkin: Yes, it got through the checks, but how many tons of drugs cross international borders? Moreover, the specifications of the intercepted plutonium do not coincide with those of the plutonium produced in Russia.

Jimenez: Could the low wages in the Russian nuclear industry encourage plutonium trafficking?

Churkin: Throughout the world there are people who want to make fast money, both among the rich and among the poor, but being poor does not mean being a thief. For instance, those going on strike in Spain cannot be accused of being potential thieves.

Jimenez: But in Russia there are official reports which describe the situation in dramatic terms.

Churkin: Yes, it is clear that there could be problems, and that is why we are treating the matter very seriously. All we producers of nuclear material must check our procedures once more, and I am certain that our country is doing so, because we are not interested in nuclear terrorism developing, either.

Jimenez: Do you believe that nuclear material is under control in other former Soviet republics?

Churkin: They are sovereign countries, and I cannot speak for them.

Jimenez: But does not Russia have some moral responsibility in this connection?

Churkin: We would have it if those countries had asked us for assistance, but since they have not done so, we have no responsibility for their nuclear facilities.

Jimenez: Do you believe that the West will try to take advantage of the controversy in order to control the Russian nuclear industry?

Churkin: Cooperation is needed, but it is clear that Russia will not allow the West to control its nuclear industry. If rules affecting all countries equally were proposed, we would consider this, but, international control over the Russian nuclear industry alone—no.

Jimenez: Do you believe that there is a real threat that some terrorist group will acquire nuclear weapons?

Churkin: I do not know whether there are terrorist organizations with that possibility, but that danger must not be underestimated. We have surmounted the danger of a global nuclear war, but the gap left by that threat could be filled by nuclear terrorism. [Passage omitted on Bosnian situation]

Counterintelligence Spokesman Tells AFP of Nuclear Arrests*AU3008122194 Paris AFP in English
1158 GMT 30 Aug 94*

[Text] Moscow, Aug 30 (AFP)—Several people were arrested in Moscow last week on suspicion of illicit trade in radioactive material, a spokesman for Russia's Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) said Tuesday.

The confirmation of the arrests came on the eve of talks in Berlin between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl that officials have said would include talks on nuclear security.

FSK spokesman Sergei Vassiliyev told AFP the group was arrested Wednesday and said the suspects were "found with radioactive material."

Vassiliyev refused to give any further details on the number or identities of those arrested, the nature of the substance they possessed or any other information about the case.

He denied however a report published Tuesday in the popular daily MOSKOVSKI KOMSOMOLETS alleging that two FSK agents were among those arrested in connection with the illegal sale of uranium.

Yeltsin meanwhile dismissed recent reports of nuclear smuggling from Russia.

"All the talk about this also lets people forget about previous reports in the foreign press on the uncontrolled production of military plutonium by foreign military nuclear centers," Yeltsin told INTERFAX in an interview.

He also attributed reports on lax controls over Russian nuclear materials to "the long-term economic interests of companies that work in this field and said "no third force" would be allowed to damage Russian-German relations.

Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev also downplayed reports on poor nuclear controls in Russia.

"All this anti-Russian noise has lost its meaning" following the visit earlier this month to Moscow by Germany's intelligence coordinator, Bernd Schmidbauer, Kozyrev told reporters on his arrival in Berlin on Monday.

Schmidbauer and FSK chief Sergei Stepashin agreed then to step up border controls and increase joint efforts to prevent nuclear smuggling.

The newspaper report Tuesday came a week after Russian authorities announced they had arrested two people caught stealing 9.5 kilograms of non-military uranium from the secret city of Arzamas-16 in the Urals.

Vassiliyev said those arrested in Moscow last week had "no relation whatsoever with the FSK."

In a front-page story headlined "Uranium Mafia Penetrates the FSK," the newspaper also recorded the FSK denial that its personnel were arrested but said the story had been confirmed through unspecified "other channels."

The report said those arrested were found with one kilogram (2.2 pounds) of a "strategic element" and that a search of their "headquarters" turned up another kilogram.

The story specifically named the element involved in the case as uranium.

It added that the alleged traffickers had stored the uranium in an "ordinary carton" and stated that neighbours of those arrested were "shocked" by the case.

ITAR-TASS news agency published an unusual dispatch late Monday quoting the FSK press service as speculating that the article was published to create a "provocation" on the eve of President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Germany.

Yeltsin was due to depart later Tuesday for Berlin, where he was to take part in ceremonies marking the withdrawal of the last Russian troops from Germany and for talks with Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

Vassiliyev confirmed reports that the FSK would file suit against MOSKOVSKI KOMSOMOLETS for publishing the article.

Journalists at the newspaper were not answering their phones Tuesday.

Counterintelligence Agents Arrested for Uranium Trading*MK3008102694 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY
KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 30 Aug 94 p 1*

[Report by Dmitriy Kholodov: "Uranium Mafia Has Penetrated the FCS. They Simply Radiated When Being Arrested"]

[Text] MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS has learned a sensational piece of news. Two Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS] officers were arrested last Wednesday right in downtown Moscow for peddling ... uranium. The origin of the uranium is unknown. The criminals were exposed by their own colleagues from the counterintelligence service. Apparently this was the first step in implementing the agreement between FCS Director Sergey Stepashin and his German counterparts on joint actions to combat the uranium mafia.

This information could not be confirmed at the FCS Public Relations Center, but confirmation has been established through other channels. It cannot be ruled out that at a time of uranium scandals, the case might well have been classified.

The detainees' neighbors are shocked. Nearly one kilogram of the strategic element was found on the smugglers. Another kilogram was confiscated during the subsequent search of the traders' "main office." Local tenants have told us that the uranium traders kept their goods in something like regular cardboard boxes. At the moment of their arrest the apartment was so contaminated that it was almost radiating.

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Kozyrev Arrives in Germany; Comments on Plutonium Seizures

LD3008034294 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0210 GMT 30 Aug 94

[Article by ITAR-TASS special correspondent Yuriy Kozlov]

[Text] Berlin, 30 Aug—Questions connected with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the physical protection of nuclear materials comprise one of the priority areas of Russia's foreign policy. The ITAR-TASS correspondent was told this by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev on his arrival early this morning at Sperenberg military airfield near Berlin. The head of the Russian diplomatic service, who yesterday completed a working visit to Yugoslavia, is to take part in the ceremony of the departure of Russian troops from Germany.

"We, like no-one else," the minister said, "are interested in very tight control in this respect, because it is precisely along the perimeter of our frontiers that those who potentially aspire to possess nuclear weapons are located." He said that around Germany or in the vicinity of the United States there were no states that were not members of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or that might tomorrow provide themselves with such weapons, while such states could easily be found on the map by the exterior borders of the CIS. Therefore, for Russia the question of control of nuclear materials is much more acute than for its Western partners, he stressed.

Going on to mention the recent incident connected with the seizure in Germany of a contraband consignment of radioactive uranium and plutonium, Kozyrev noted that after the talks in Moscow between representative delegations of Russia and Germany, the "hullabaloo with an anti-Russian tinge" raised in some of the media had finally lost its justification. Now, he added, with the help of the departments concerned, the main task consists of doing everything to develop "the cooperation of the relevant experts in thwarting and exposing" incidents of leakage of radioactive materials into channels of illicit trafficking. "Theoretically, this could happen in any nuclear state, but that is no reason to start any kind of propaganda campaign against this state," the Russian minister pointed out. Such incidents, in his opinion, only stress the need to unite efforts and take preventive and corrective measures.

Ministry Claims German Intelligence 'Planted' Plutonium

AU3108125894 Paris AFP in English
1221 GMT 31 August 94

[Text] Bonn, Aug 31 (AFP)—German intelligence agents planned the record seizure of 350 grams (12.4 ounces) of plutonium 239 at Munich airport earlier this month, a spokesman for the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy has charged.

The plutonium was "put on a Lufthansa plane by the German secret service to discredit Russia," Georgi Kaurov told the German weekly STERN in its issue to be published Thursday.

The scam was a "provocation," he added.

Russian leaders have so far denied that plutonium found in luggage carried by a passenger on arrival in Munich on August 10 originated in Russia.

But senior Russian scientists would not rule out that the lethal radioactive substance was of Russian origin.

It takes only a few kilograms (pounds) of plutonium to make an atomic bomb.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Chancellor Helmut Kohl were expected to discuss the smuggling of radioactive substances on the sidelines of ceremonies in Berlin marking the departure of the last Russian troops from Germany.

German Social Democrats, the biggest opposition group in the German parliament, earlier accused Kohl of searching for a "domestic policy success without caring about people's health" ahead of general elections due October 16.

Saying the seizures had been "staged" the Social Democrats said Kohl's center-right government had failed to use intelligence reports to stop plutonium smugglers before they could enter Germany.

STERN said its correspondents had visited the top secret Krasnoyarsk-16 nuclear center in Siberia where the plutonium seized in Munich was allegedly made.

Cars and trucks can enter the center unhindered and there are no passport controls or bag checks, the magazine said.

The report came after a Russian government spokesman said thieves had stolen a capsule containing 4.5 grammes of radioactive cesium-137 from a chemicals plant at Tarnobov, southeast of Moscow.

Company Employees Caught Trying To Sell 'Radioactive Substances'

WS1309121494 Kaliningrad STRAZH BALTIKI
in Russian 31 Aug 94 p 1

[Report by STRAZH BALTIKI information service:
"Container Worth \$1 Million"]

[Text] One million dollars. This fantastic price was named by two Kaliningrad residents who attempted to sell a container in St. Petersburg. No wonder, given that the container was full of radioactive substances. The attempt to sell radioactive substances was prevented by agents of the Department for Combating Organized Crime, a division of the Kaliningrad Oblast Interior Department. The sellers—Kaliningrad residents, employees of the "Baltares" company—were caught red-handed. They were arrested and their involvement in the attempt to sell a container with radioactive substances has been proven. This, in particular, was stated during a televised report by militia Colonel Andrey Sorokin, chief of the Department for Combating Organized Crime.

It has been discovered that the weight of the container is 40 to 50 kg. Meanwhile, it is still unknown which substance is inside the "box." Dmitry Sorokin, head of the Kaliningrad Inspection for Monitoring Radiation Safety, has told a STRAZH BALTIKI correspondent that the seized shipment constitutes no danger to human health. Agents of the

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Baltic Fleet's special services who have assumed responsibility for the custody of the container, have made all the necessary measurements and verified its containment.

Where does the "stuff" come from? According to D. Sorokin, no thefts of radioactive substances have been observed in 1994 in the facilities located in Kaliningrad Oblast. According to unsubstantiated reports, the dangerous shipment comes from either Chelyabinsk or Krasnoyarsk. However, this is just an assumption and it has not yet been verified.

Rumors to the effect that the radioactive substances seized in St. Petersburg have any relation to the Baltic Fleet, are groundless. This has been told to STRAZH BALTIKI by First Rank Captain Ivan Bondarenko, deputy chief of the Baltic Fleet's Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Service. According to him, the units and subunits of the service have nothing in common with either custody or transportation of the seized shipment. Bondarenko's subordinates were not invited to participate as experts in the examination of the container.

In other words, there are still a lot of unclear episodes in this scandalous affair. Specialists from St. Petersburg or Moscow, who are expected to arrive in Kaliningrad mid-week will probably shed some light on the nature of radioactive substances in the container. There is no equipment in Kaliningrad necessary for conducting an appropriate analysis of the substance.

The INTERFAX report on the seizure of the shipment in St. Petersburg mentions the Baltares manager's involvement in the affair. We have discovered that this company—an association with limited liability—is registered in the Kaliningrad Oblast Tax Inspection and has an office in Kaliningrad. According to the documents, the company carries out projects on design and technological planning and has no relation to the military-industrial complex.

The "Baltares" company was founded by private persons, including a teacher at one of the city schools—once a famous sportsman. We would like to point out that the official address of the company is at the same time the private address of its manager.

Such are the details of this unusual affair, revealed in the course of STRAZH BALTIKI's reporter investigation. We intentionally do not make any conclusions, for this is a prerogative of competent bodies conducting the official investigation. These bodies will dot all the "i's." In its turn, STRAZH BALTIKI promises to inform its readers about the outcome of this affair.

Atomic Energy Spokesman Rejects Plutonium Theft Claims

MM0109085794 Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA in Russian 31 Aug 94 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Georgiy Kurov, chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy Information Administration, by correspondent Valeriy Kondrashov under the rubric "Radiophobia"; place, date not given:

"300 Grams of Plutonium Would Be Enough To Contaminate Half Germany, But Russia Has Nothing To Do With This, Ministry of Atomic Energy Asserts"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The affair of the so-called Russian plutonium-239 found at Munich airport in the possession of a three-in-an international team comprising a Colombian, a Spaniard, and a Frenchman is continuing to disturb public opinion. But now that passions in this connection have nevertheless abated slightly and the topic itself has lost its touch of sensationalism, thoughts such as "Is there really anything to this story?" are coming to mind. What was behind the ill-fated 300 grams of radioactive material that arrived in Germany aboard a Lufthansa flight? NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA correspondent Valeriy Kondrashov discusses this with Georgiy Kurov, chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy Information Administration.

Kondrashov: Georgiy Alekseyevich, the German side claimed that Russian nuclear enterprises are engaging in "illicit" deals in radioactive materials because of the disintegration of the sector and the lack of resources in the hope of thereby rectifying their material position.

Kurov: We should clearly start with the fact that enterprises and associations in the Russian nuclear sector do not sell raw materials independently. This trade is handled by the special "Tekhnabeksport" firm, which carries out all commercial deals involving uranium, plutonium, and other materials used in nuclear technologies. So we have no questions here. As for the situation with regard to safekeeping, there is a basic need to make a distinction between two things here. On the one hand you can speak of substances that can be used in warhead manufacture, for instance, uranium-235, uranium-233, and plutonium-235. On the other hand there are other nuclear materials that have no application in military industry and are used only as industrial materials. For instance, uranium-238, hundreds of tonnes of which are kept at storage depots and which we are prepared to sell to anyone. Uranium is the heaviest element of all and it can be used as ballast or, if you like, as a weight when you are making pickled cabbage. But when they hear the word "uranium" or "plutonium" people think only of nuclear weapons. The other day the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] called us and reported that around 9 kg of uranium-238 had been stolen from a depot at Arzamas-16. Whether or not it has been stolen has yet to be established, but even if you assume that the theft took place, what could be done with it? Who would buy it? It would only be bought out of ignorance.

Kondrashov: Incidentally, what is the price of this kind of uranium on the world market?

Kurov: Around \$10 per pound. But all you can get for it nowadays is a spell in jail. So the theft is pointless.

Kondrashov: Let's return to the Munich affair. Why did the German side immediately state with such conviction that the plutonium detained in Germany was of Russian origin?

Kurov: If you analyze the situation carefully, you will find a whole series of events preceding this incident. First

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reports appeared in the world press to the effect that so-called red mercury was leaking out of Russia. There was a terrible ballyhoo. We were pestered over this "red mercury" just as we are now being pestered over plutonium. We replied that "red mercury" is not used in nuclear warhead manufacture or in our nuclear technologies. Our enterprises do not produce the "red mercury" whose chemical formula was quoted to us, and in general we have no idea what this is all about.

Kondrashov: But "red mercury" does exist?

Kaurov: Yes, but only in the chemical sense and clearly not with the physical and chemical properties we were told of. If you take the journal *KHIMIYA I ZHIZN* for the last year, in issue No. 1 Academician Petryanov-Sokolov writes that this is the case. But the substance in question does not exist. But over the last 12-18 months the German press has been featuring articles saying that nuclear reactors in Russia are unsafe and should be closed. Although masses of all kinds of commissions from the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] and other international organizations have visited us and have never found any foul play or cases of negligence. Even the German environment minister came here, but the press campaign continued. And now I think the third stage has begun—about the supposed plutonium leak. The aim is simple—to undermine the nuclear industry, nuclear power, and nuclear technology in Russia.

Kondrashov: Maybe there is also another aim—to make money out of reconstructing a reactor, say?

Kaurov: Yes, there is competition, perfectly normal competition, which we ourselves were seeking when we entered upon capitalism. The West clearly thinks that anything goes in the struggle against our nuclear technologies, which in terms of a number of indicators are considerably better than anything else, including in America—for instance, with regard to plutonium and uranium production. This is why this purposeful campaign to squeeze us out of the market is under way. They have seen that we have a very great deal of good-quality pure uranium that we are prepared to sell.

Another point. The nuclear sector, no matter what may be said, has not suffered neglect and decline and has survived amid this universal free-for-all. Despite profound conversion, our production has constantly increased, including in the spheres of the control and protection of nuclear materials. People are now saying: Let's place the Russian nuclear complex under international control. No one will ever permit this, because we do not need this. We have proof that the plutonium and uranium that were discovered there are not of Russian origin.

Kondrashov: What sort of proof?

Kaurov: First, every milligram of plutonium is registered from the moment of its production. In the shop where the plutonium is weighed and placed into containers, it is handled by at least five people. Then, when they leave the plutonium areas, each of them undergoes special inspection [kontrol]—it is impossible to take anything out. Second, plutonium is stuff that it is very tricky to handle. You can't simply put it in your pocket. It is extremely

dangerous, it is toxic, and so it is impossible simply to pick it up in your hands. There are no leaks in our country. The German side cannot convincingly prove that the plutonium came from Russia. They tell us to justify ourselves. But why should we?

There is another point that must be taken into account. Extreme caution is necessary in transporting and handling plutonium. It is a terrible contagion. The 300 grams in question would be enough to poison half Germany. The Germans acted as follows: Though they knew there was plutonium on the aircraft, and moreover in a container that was not designed for storage of plutonium, they did not warn the Russian special services. It should not have been allowed onto the aircraft, it should have been removed before takeoff, because anything could have happened during the flight.

There are also some other points, but, for my part, I can say that the ministry is confident about its storage of plutonium and uranium-235, we need no help, and we will not give anyone access to our secrets.

Kondrashov: Personally I was very astonished by the fact that contraband plutonium should suddenly turn up on the same aircraft that was taking Deputy Atomic Industry Minister Viktor Sidorenko to an international conference. How did he himself react to this fact?

Kaurov: I discussed this with Viktor Alekseyevich. The point is that he returned to Moscow the next day and learned of this whole affair there. As for the conference itself, it went all right. But all in all this is nasty, especially as Academician Sidorenko is a very courteous, cultured, intellectual person and a major scientist. And to link his name with this affair....

Kondrashov: Representatives of your ministry met with German emissary Schmidbauer. What came of this meeting? Was our side given the chemical analysis of the plutonium about which they had been talking for so long?

Kaurov: The chemical analysis was brought along. Admittedly, our people asked that it be made more detailed, but anyhow it is practically impossible to prove the origin of plutonium by chemical analysis. If there are nuances between our reactors, there are also nuances between American reactors, for instance. So you need to have a database on all the nuclear reactors in the world that have ever produced plutonium. First, this is pointless, and, second, no one will ever provide those data. Incidentally, this is all the more pointless in that the plutonium was not weapons-grade, as expert assessment confirmed. Nor is it suitable as fuel for nuclear reactors.

Kondrashov: Nevertheless, let us return to the recent case of the disappearance of uranium-238 from Arzamas-16. How many such incidents are there a year?

Kaurov: For the moment let's not say it was a disappearance. That has yet to be established. Assemblies consisting precisely of this uranium are sometimes destroyed at Arzamas. Then they are buried and they are not guarded, because it is not dangerous. First of all we must investigate.

Kondrashov: Okay, but are there any proven cases?

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Kaurov: We are firmly certain of three cases of attempts to steal uranium-238 and one similar case involving uranium-235 in 1993-1994, but all these cases were cleared up. Although the MVD, which actually provides perimeter security at our enterprises, speaks of 11 cases. But, one way or another, all the guilty parties were punished. [Kaurov ends]

From the Editorial Office

Despite the embraces exchanged by Federal Counterintelligence Service leader Sergey Stepashin and Bernd Schmidbauer, official representative of the German special services, when they met, you get the feeling that the ill-fated plutonium-239 affair certainly did nothing to make them any stronger. One side is accusing the other of trying to make a mountain out of a molehill, while the other is saying that they are trying to make a molehill out of a mountain. However, it has to be noted that the hasty statement regarding the Russian origin of the plutonium that ended up in Munich and the scale of the propaganda campaign mounted in the German press about this played very much into the hands of those who are attempting to bring about a chill in relations between the FRG and Russia and also to squeeze out dangerous competitors in the extremely profitable market in nuclear materials. All this could scarcely be to the advantage of the Russian side.

Officials on Protection of Nuclear Materials

LD0609180294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1520 GMT 6 Sep 94

[Article by ITAR-TASS correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

[Text] Moscow September 6 TASS—"The system of physical protection of nuclear materials in Russia is organized at the highest level", Yuriy Volodin, head of the Department for Supervision over Assessment and Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials of the Russian State Committee for Nuclear Supervision, told a news conference here today.

According to him, this committee controls organizations of the Ministry of Nuclear Power Engineering, the Defense Ministry, the Russian Committee for Defense Industry and the Academy of Sciences which deal with nuclear materials.

Although so far supervision does not apply to "finished products" intended for military use, this problem will soon be resolved, Yuriy Volodin believes.

However, already now "materials of the first category" such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium, are "guarded well enough". Therefore it is impossible to steal a quantity of nuclear materials sufficient for manufacturing nuclear weapons.

The expert considers, a greater danger is presented not by defense enterprises but research institutions. It is exactly there a so-called "nuclear terrorism" is taking place when people steal radioactive materials which do not present either military or scientific interest.

Yuriy Rogozhin, head of the press center of State Committee for Nuclear Supervision, "recommended" potential sellers first to receive "rudimentary knowledge" of nuclear science so as not to grab unnecessary waste uranium.

Yuriy Volodin also confirmed that he did not know cases when somebody wished to buy such a commodity.

Touching on the problems of carrying out supervision over assessment and physical protection of nuclear materials, Yuriy Volodin said that so far there was no state system of assessment and control over nuclear materials in Russia. But already now a corresponding resolution of the Russian government is under preparation.

Technical means of control over nuclear materials and a legal base in this field should also be improved, Yuriy Volodin pointed out.

Nuclear Inspectorate Chief's Briefing on Uranium Thefts

MM0709104194 Moscow TRUD in Russian 7 Sep 94 p 1

[Report by Aleksandr Yermakov: "Uranium Thefts"]

[Text] The fact that the threat of nuclear terrorism exists, and not just in Joe Public's imagination, was stated yesterday at a press conference at the Russian-U.S. Information Press Center. Yu. Volodin, chief of the Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety Administration Supervising the Registration and Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, answered journalists' questions.

He described the concept of everyday nuclear terrorism as a situation whereby stolen nuclear material does not pose any danger but the very fact of the theft elicits a major public response. A certain atmosphere is created and the population displays an unhealthy reaction, which may by and large have depressing social and political consequences. So far, thank God, things have not gone as far as specific complexities, but the likelihood of their arising cannot be ruled out.

Thefts of enriched uranium and plutonium from defense installations for the manufacture of nuclear weapons are virtually impossible.

However, everyone now knows about the recent instances of nuclear materials being seized in Germany. "Stories" slipped into some mass media of accords, specifically between the Russian and Italian mafias, to use drug trafficking channels for the illegal transportation of nuclear materials. In this connection your TRUD correspondent asked about mafia structures' possible involvement in the "uranium case."

"If anyone is interested in stealing and selling nuclear components, it is evidently with the object of selling them," Yu. Volodin said. "The vendors are arrested—and fairly often at that—but the buyer has never yet been caught. I would be happy to meet just one of them. To find out why they want this weapons-grade uranium or plutonium...."

KAZAKHSTAN

Allegations of Trading in Nuclear Materials

LD2208193194 Moscow NTV in Russian
1800 GMT 22 Aug 94

[Text] Our television company received a rather interesting report from our colleagues in Kazakhstan today. A nuclear reactor near Almaty, which belongs to the national nuclear center of Kazakhstan, has attracted the attention

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of some politicians and journalists. Special vehicles designed for the haulage of radioactive materials, including uranium, are often seen leaving the territory where the non-working 30 megawatt reactor is situated. Some specialists believe that these moves happen far too often for a non-working reactor. That is why some politicians in Kazakhstan allege that the republic may be trading in nuclear materials. An expert from the Kazakh nuclear research center did not deny these allegations. [video shows map of Kazakhstan]

LITHUANIA

TV Program on Smuggling, 'Irregularities' at Nuclear Plant

AU2008172894

[Editorial Report] Mainz ZDF Television Network in German at 1915 GMT on 19 August carries a 30-minute report by Horst Stenzel on irregularities involving the Ignalina nuclear power plant in Lithuania.

The report begins with an interview with an unidentified informer, who says that poverty makes people in Russia get involved in such deals.

The correspondent reports that 24 crates of radioactive beryllium were found at a bank in Vilnius in May 1992 and that the Lithuanian Investment Bank received \$20,000 for storing the material. The bank's director denied that anything illegal went on, although authorities measured elevated radioactivity. The correspondent is denied access to Vilnius University where the material was examined.

A German expert at the Stuttgart subsidiary of an unnamed "U.S. market leader" explains what beryllium is. He says that it is used in reactor construction as a moderator and reflector for neutrons, but also as a barrier for nuclear warheads and that his company has also been offered beryllium of Russian origin in the past, but they "categorically reject such offers."

Juozas Jacevicius, deputy director of the Lithuanian Customs Administration, says that Lithuania does not produce radioactive material, but transit routes run through the country. His authority has "not found a single case of radioactive material," because they do not even have the equipment to check radioactive substances.

The correspondent points out that the Moscow-Kaliningrad route is one of the most important smuggling routes in Europe. Baggage is not checked in Moscow, and on the transit route through Lithuania the material is usually handed over to mediators.

Pranas Dragunaitis, commander of the Lithuanian border troops, explains that the border guards "have no way of making checks, because they do not have the necessary instruments." He says that "Vilnius is one of the major centers of nuclear smuggling," because routes from Moscow, Kaliningrad, and St. Petersburg meet here. These routes run through Poland to Germany. Dragunaitis invites the television crew to join him at the Lithuania-Belarus border point at the village of Kena. They report

that nuclear smugglers get across the border easily as the train from Moscow cannot be checked because doors are locked from the inside.

A bar is shown where a man offers to establish a contact for nuclear material.

The correspondent visits another border point, which also lacks instruments for measuring radioactivity. When guards see the television cameras, checks are very thorough. The reporter concludes that border guards would be completely overtaxed with hunting nuclear smugglers. Prosecutor General Paulauskas is quoted as saying in a newspaper interview that he "could arrest at least one border guard a day for taking bribes." "But he does not do it, which makes the border police so popular," the correspondent concludes.

At the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Hans-Friedrich Meyer explains that at least eight kilograms of plutonium or 25 kilograms of uranium is needed for building a nuclear bomb and that "such amounts have not nearly turned up anywhere." He says the IAEA has no control over the ex-Soviet Union and that there have been safety checks in Lithuanian nuclear power plants. The correspondent reports that the IAEA has listed hundreds of faults at the Ignalina power plant, but that there is no reference to nuclear material having disappeared from the facility.

The correspondent visits Visaginas near Ignalina. He says that houses there are in very bad repair and there is enormous vandalism. Kastytis Matulevichius, director of the local hospital, explains safety checks for workers. He says that checks cannot be analyzed because there are no funds for buying the necessary instruments.

Pictures of the power plant with Chernobyl-type reactors are shown, and the correspondent reports that one complete fuel rod has already gone missing. The report says that the director of Ignalina refused to let journalists enter the plant; he only made archive pictures available. Later the correspondent learned that a serious incident had occurred two days previously.

Viktor Shevaldin, director of Ignalina, is interviewed on safety measures. He says that the Bank of Lithuania and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development have promised to pay over 30 million ECU toward a safety program. On the missing fuel rod, he comments that this information is one year old and that he is certain "the rod is somewhere on the premises." He explains that the rod "is neither interesting for military nor for commercial purposes, because it is not enriched uranium."

Energy Minister Algimantas Stasiukynas stresses that closing down Ignalina would be too expensive and that there is no alternative to nuclear power.

The correspondent reports that Ignalina director Shevaldin has asked astrologer Pavel Globa to forecast the day a disaster will occur at Ignalina. The astrologer says that the safety system at Ignalina seems excellent, but predicts a major accident, comparable with Chernobyl, in three years' time. He says that 50 percent of the Belarus population will be killed.

The report concludes by saying that Lithuania depends on the help of the West in putting an end to nuclear smuggling.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Europol Prepares To Combat Nuclear Smuggling

AU3008133094 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 30 Aug 94 p 4

[Report by Ernst Levy: "What Europol Could Do To Combat Nuclear Smuggling"]

[Text] The Hague, 29 August—In recent weeks, cases of illegal cross-border nuclear smuggling have shocked politicians and the public in Western countries. Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel have recommended that the European police authority Europol in The Hague should be entrusted with the investigations. So far, Europol's responsibility has been restricted to international drug-related crimes and money laundering.

Currently, a convention—a legal basis for Europol's work—is being prepared in which future responsibilities will be defined. According to Europol Coordinator Storbeck—who is also a departmental head in the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation [BKA]—the convention will also include the "new phenomena" of international organized crime. Since the spring of this year, nuclear smuggling has been one of these. Storbeck believes that quick action is required to combat these new crimes, because the national authorities "cannot do enough at present." Regarding nuclear smuggling, Europol would be in a position "within a relatively short time" to "give the same support" as in the struggle against drug-related crime. However, for this purpose, Europol would have to be specifically authorized. Storbeck said, however, that this required a political decision of all European Union (EU) member states, which would then have to be formulated in a ministerial agreement.

It is not very realistic to expect miracles of Europol's involvement in combating nuclear smuggling. Its drug unit is not permitted to act on its own, but only at the "request" of national customs and police authorities of EU member states. In this respect, Europol merely "supports" their investigations by obtaining the relevant data, including personal data, and by making available its own analyses. In obtaining data, Europol is no more than a central office for the exchange of information. The liaison officers of the national customs and police authorities that are assigned to The Hague act as a link for, and carry out, the exchange of information. These national liaison officials only have access to the database of their own country and decide on the basis of their own provisions, including those of their country's data protection law, whether or not the requested information can be passed on to another country's liaison officer. So far, a prerequisite for such information has been "dual culpability"—the suspected act must be punishable in both countries "involved."

Instead of working for the national police authorities at home, the liaison officers work in a common office in The Hague, the Europol coordinator says, explaining the system. This has the advantage that in case of a request, the customs and police liaison people of a certain country ask their colleagues from other countries in the adjacent rooms

who can provide the information requested "within a few minutes or hours." The information has always been provided, Storbeck says.

The only really independent work of Europol is in preparing "analyses." In this respect, information is cross-referenced so as to find out the routes of drug supplies. The question is, however, whether such general analyses are worth much, since it is not permissible to identify individuals. For the time being, Europol is not even permitted to collect information in a central database.

Commenting on statements of German politicians in connection with nuclear smuggling, Storbeck says "it is easy just to speak about 'Europol.'" First of all, the prerequisites must be created. He sees a major problem in the fact that nuclear smuggling "in this form" is not punishable everywhere. Therefore, Europol can only help several EU member states in carrying out investigations.

Another obstacle to possible assistance in investigations into nuclear smuggling is "the dual culpability," according to Storbeck. But once the Schengen Agreement is in force, this obstacle will be largely removed, because it envisages the renunciation of dual culpability "in normal cases of mutual assistance." However, three EU states are not members of this agreement. The Europol coordinator sees no problems in Great Britain, because there are specific provisions on nuclear smuggling. The Europol coordinator assumes that in view of these new forms of crime, a single criminal code will largely be adopted, not least because some countries still do not have the relevant laws.

Storbeck hopes the convention will be adopted by the EU interior and justice ministers this autumn. From then on, and once its responsibilities have been extended, "Europol will really be Europol," its coordinator says. Other additional steps will be taken. Basically, preliminary work and supportive work on international investigations will then "largely" be shifted to Europol, without the authority being permitted to carry out independent investigations. The real police responsibilities as such—interrogation of suspects, searches, arrests, and the handing over of cases to the courts—will also continue to rest with national police and customs authorities.

The draft convention also envisages the installation of a central Europol computer. Then Europol will itself be able to collect and obtain data and material automatically. Then we can start "playing with the computer," as the Europol coordinator says.

The convention will also contain essential elements of data protection, which, according to Storbeck, will also have a considerable impact on the introduction of a "police data protection law" in those member states that do not have such a law. Europol is holding out prospects for the European Union eventually to have a "common European police data protection law."

Regarding the creation of a European office of criminal investigation, the Europol coordinator sees three options. He considers it possible, for instance, to entrust the police authority of a member state with the investigations of a case, or delegate to it an entire field of responsibilities. The police authorities in other EU member states could give

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assistance within the framework of their respective laws. He mentions as another option, which in his view would be "much more flexible," to set up "international permanent special commissions" or special units. The members of such commissions would in each case apply their own national laws in their investigations, because there is no European criminal code, European code of criminal procedure, or European police law. The member states would maintain their responsibilities. In such a model, too, Europol would again only have a supportive role.

Storbeck mentions as his third option the development of Europol as a separate investigative authority. Its members would no longer be under the control of the national police authorities. However, in Storbeck's view, this variant entails many difficulties. He believes that criminal codes, police laws, and codes of criminal procedure will remain national for a long time to come. In addition, the lack of a European framework even tells against a "European FBI," Storbeck says. If one really wanted Europol to be an independent authority with its own responsibilities, Europol officials would have to know all the laws of the member states, Storbeck says.

AUSTRIA

No Major Instances of Plutonium Smuggling Reported

AU2208091794 Vienna KURIER in German
21 Aug 94 pp 6-7

[Report by Gerald Reischl and Wilhelm Theuretsbacher: "Plutonium: Hot Cargo From Moscow"]

[Excerpt] For six months he played the role of a nuclear dealer: Kyrill Belyaninov, reporter with the Moscow daily LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. What the 26-year-old Russian experienced makes the West tremble and even made the president act.

"I was offered uranium for 20 bottles of Vodka," he says in an interview with KURIER. Stolen from nuclear factories, laboratories, and nuclear power plants. "One kilo of plutonium would have cost \$400,000." One kilo of plutonium 239 is sufficient to poison 37 million people. Last week 300 grams of this material was seized at Munich Airport. On 10 May 1994, 60 grams of plutonium was discovered in the house of German businessman Adolf Jaeckle. This is enough to eliminate the whole of Austria. The world is in turmoil: The nuclear Mafia might threaten mankind.

"Austria is at least as much affected as Germany," Bavarian Interior Minister Guenther Beckstein warns in an interview with KURIER. Even at the time of the Cold War Austria had a special position with good contacts with the Arab area and to the East. "The Third Man is alive." In fact, since the collapse of the Soviet Union a dense network of nuclear Mafia has also developed in Austria. The gold-rush atmosphere has activated dubious businessmen, who deal with everything that is good, expensive—and mostly stolen. The range goes from the poison of the Caucasian Levant viper to "rare-earth" elements such as caesium or rubidium. Just from the area of Vienna

KURIER has obtained documents of almost 30 companies that are faxing each other dubious offers. They even deal in radioactive material.

In Vienna's Praterstern Square three kilos of uranium pellets for fuel rods for the Soviet WWR 1000 reactor and for a Skoda test reactor were seized in June 1992. Originally, the deal involved 15 kilos of scandium, which the "Multikontrakt" company from Bratislava offered. But The Vienna agents and the Italian customers waited in vain.

A few weeks later "Multikontrakt" reportedly offered weapons-grade uranium as a substitute. When it was supposed to be handed over in Praterstern Square, the anti-terror unit EBT [anti-terror task force] was waiting. Even a Slovak government delegation later intervened for the arrested men, Dr. Peter K., Jan C., and Juraz S. and soon afterwards they were released. The uranium was indeed radioactive but was not of weapons-grade quality.

Another three nuclear smugglers were arrested at Schwechat Airport in July 1993. They, too, carried "only" uranium pellets. Since the material was not of weapons-grade quality, the perpetrators were released.

After these "disappointments," the State Police reduced their activities in the field of nuclear smuggling. An easy game for the plutonium smugglers? Their business operates at two levels: The big deal for building the bomb operates at the highest level. The buyers are governments. The sellers are suspected to be members of the nuclear industry of the former Soviet Union.

These deals can be conducted only via highly specialized laboratories. "Austria plays only the role of a transportation route in this case, because here we have no private possibilities for analysis," Michael Sika, director general for public security, says. Only the Seibersdorf Research Center is able to analyze plutonium. But Seibersdorf is considered to be absolutely secure. Sika: "If someone goes to Seibersdorf with plutonium he could just as well go to the State Police."

In fact, so far only "a few bits"—in total about three grams of plutonium—have been seized in Austria, Research Center Head Alfons Bartscher says. The plutonium was unusable because it was a metallic compound. It was applied to the tip of a smoke detector. Over the past five years Bartscher has had to make about 30 analyses of seized radioactive material. [passage omitted]

Hungarian Uranium Salesman's Auto Had Villach Plates

AU0109101394 Vienna KURIER in German 1 Sep 94 p 11

[Unattributed report: "Nuclear Materials Smuggler Had Apartment in Vienna"]

[Text] With the arrest of two uranium salesmen, those involved in investigating the smuggling of nuclear materials have once again established a link with Austria: One of the two Hungarians who were arrested in Budapest trying to sell two kg of radioactive materials ran a pension in Austria for many years. He, a lawyer, is also said to have had an apartment in Vienna. He worked as a police officer

in Hungary. In addition, the man is supposed to be "a legal adviser to a prominent person in Hungarian public life."

As has already been reported, following the prevention of the plutonium deal near Hamburg in Germany, German investigators chased an Austrian automobile with what were probably Villach license plates. The plutonium messenger, who left behind a sample of radioactive plutonium 233, has not been found to date.

The two Hungarian nuclear salesmen under arrest—a 51-year-old and a 52-year-old—are said to have asked for almost 900,000 schillings for their goods. The men were arrested on Tuesday evening at the parking lot of a Budapest hotel by a special unit after having been observed over a long period of time.

The suspected potential client was able to escape in a Mazda 626. He apparently drove through a police road-block.

Two kg of "expertly" packed radioactive material were left behind. The uranium fuel rods were in an automobile trunk. A police spokesman said that higher radioactivity readings were registered near the automobiles. However, the uranium fuel rods that were seized could hardly have been put to any use.

Weekly Publishes 'Secret' Report on Nuclear Smuggling

AU0809171394 Vienna NEWS in German
8 Sep 94 pp 42-44

[Report by Alfred Worm: "Secret Report: Radioactive Merchandise"]

[Excerpts] The document that was compiled by the Austrian State Police in cooperation with the German Federal Office of Criminal Investigations [BKA] bears the title "Nuclear Crimes" and is subtitled "Illegal Trade With Radioactive Materials or Other Hazardous Substances—Situation Report Austria."

Here is its conclusion: "...has to be noted that underestimating illegal trade with radioactive material but also other hazardous substances will certainly have serious effects. The most recent past shows that this trade and the possibilities of these groups of criminals must by no means be underestimated..."

Compared to "most European states, the seizure of radioactive material in Austria... has been rather high," the report notes.

"Incidents"

Austria itself is only a transit country, but one with a considerable criminal record: Between 1991 and the first half of 1994, there were 31 concrete cases of hints and evidence of "illegal trade with uranium or plutonium" and 232 (!) incidents involving "other hazardous substances." Uranium/plutonium are out as commercial goods, while deals with radioactive isotopes (such as Cobalt-60, Cesium-137, Strontium-90, Osmium-186, Iridium-192, etc.) are increasing.

In 1993, the state police became active when a group from the CIS and the Czech Republic tried to sell radioactive

material to the West via Austria. The plan failed because they did not find any clients. These people are now allegedly "involved in the construction of warheads that release radioactive substances when they explode. These bombs are said to have electronic timers and are used to blackmail Western governments. It was planned to place them in five different locations, mainly in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, and one of the bombs should have been set off" (Nuclear Report).

Transit

The document laconically notes that "due to its geographic situation," Austria "is involved in almost any illegal East-West trade, which has even been favored through the opening of the East and, most importantly, the disintegration of the former USSR." [passage omitted]

Since the middle of 1992, pipes and barrels containing zirconium have been stored at Vienna's Schwechat airport after they were imported illegally by a Liechtenstein company from Russia with the help of an Austrian shipping agency. So far, it has not been possible to determine an addressee.

The circle of smugglers has meanwhile been narrowed down at a European level. It includes "about 60 people who had come to the attention of the authorities before because of involvement in suspected illegal arms trade or because of trade with radioactive materials or otherwise hazardous substances. They are using existing structures for smuggling, but not only with the intention to cheat, since these people are obviously in a position to supply really radioactive and weapons-grade material to the black market" (report). [passage omitted]

The last time radioactive substances were seized in Austria was in June 1994. Police originally thought they were on the tracks of a Croatian: In the apartment of Ilja M., they found 5.7 kg of uranium and a Croatian passport. Yet, the document turned out to be falsified: Ilja M. in reality is a former member of the Bosnian Government who entered the underground in Carinthia with false documents.

On 17 pages, the Nuclear Report lists all illegal incidents that bear "a relation to Austria." [passage omitted]

Need To Act

In most cases, there are international connections. In 1993, German authorities were looking for a Mr. Knut K. on the grounds of nuclear smuggling. German police got on the track of an Italian company, which, in turn, acted through a company of Vorarlberg. The merchandise: cesium and osmium. Shortly after that, three German citizens were arrested in Linz for smuggling osmium, eight grams of which, worth \$60,000, were confiscated.

Recent developments: A Belgian is allegedly planning to take four kg of plutonium from Vienna to Iraq this year—the material was stored in safes at Vienna's Schwechat airport. In February, evidence from Germany was growing stronger that a certain Christa B. wanted to sell nuclear material from Romania to a "Werner in Austria." Czech citizen Karel D. is said to be dealing in osmium and rubidium in Ukraine and Austria (Gamlitz). In April, the Austrian authorities were told that a certain Frank B.

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offered 40 kg of uranium with a degree of purity of 70 percent, Osmium-187, rubidium, Cesium-133, and scandium for sale in Germany. The most recent incident happened on 7 July 1994 at Frankfurt airport, where police discovered nuclear material that was to be shipped to Vienna. The goods, which were declared as "safeguard equipment," came from Pakistan and were addressed to a company in Gratkorn.

Quote from the report: "It is... absolutely necessary to take action."

BELGIUM

MP Says Nuclear Material Seized in Liege

BR1908150494 Brussels LE SOIR in French
19 Aug 94 p 16

[Article by Marc Metdepenningen: "A Small Seizure of Nuclear Material in Belgium"]

[Text] On 26 May 1994, replying to a question in Parliament by Live Differently [Flemish Greens] MP Jos Geysels about trafficking in radioactive material, Justice Minister Melchior Wathelet indicated briefly that: "For three years, some rare cases of illicit attempts to sell very small quantities of nuclear material have been brought to the knowledge of the judicial authorities." The Agalev MP, not satisfied with this reply, reformulated his question in the Bulletin of parliamentary questions and replies of 16 August this year. He is planning to reveal the information reported to him when Parliament reconvenes in September: A seizure of a small quantity of uranium oxide, originating from a civilian nuclear plant in Eastern Europe, was made at the start of the year in the Liege judicial district. The Liege public prosecutor's office, which did not initiate an investigation into the incident, refused to comment on Thursday [18 August] regarding the circumstances of this seizure described as "delicate" due to its nature, rather than the degree of danger.

The seizures made since last May in Germany have led in Belgium to information being gathered together. The Justice Ministry has asked all the general public prosecutors to send it all information which could be related to radioactive material trafficking. The national police has made a similar request to all the country's brigades. And recently, a coordination meeting took place in Zaventem airport between customs officers, the national police, the Nuclear Security Department, and the State Security Service to refine the control procedures to be implemented.

In Belgium, controls of radioactive materials are carried out by the Nuclear Security Department, an organization which falls under the Justice Ministry. This department is responsible for checking the security of people working in the nuclear sector, the protection of the facilities, illicit trafficking in nuclear material, and for accompanying International Atomic Energy Agency's inspectors who inspect Belgian facilities throughout the year. These "nuclear cops" have the same powers as the judicial police and intervene as experts when suspect material is discovered.

In recent years, the Nuclear Security Department has been called in for attempts at "nuclear fraud." As in all Western

countries, criminals offer public organizations pseudo-nuclear material which they attempt to sell at high prices. This material obviously does not stand up to the analysis of the specialists who examine it. The potential "victims" of the criminals have developed a process which allows them to unmask the criminals quickly.

The analysis of the seizures made in Germany is leading the Belgian Nuclear Security Department to the same conclusions as those of many Western services: The "traffickers" are amateur adventurers who place their hopes of making a fortune quickly in the diversion of radioactive material. They have no designated objective and expose themselves to considerable risks by transporting contaminating material in makeshift conditions.

Nuclear Smuggling Cases Reported

BR0909140594 Antwerp GAZET VAN ANTWERPEN
in Dutch 8 Sep 94 p 1

[Unattributed article: "State Security and Justice Minister Wathelet Confirm 10 Cases—Nuclear Smuggling in Belgium Too"]

[Text] In the past three years, the Belgian Nuclear Security service has tracked down 10 cases of "illegal trading in nuclear material (uranium or plutonium)." In one case, a Czech was arrested with uranium oxide. Justice Minister Melchior Wathelet gave the information in answer to a question by Agalev [Flemish Green] MP Jos Geysels. Wathelet confirmed our information (see GAZET VAN ANTWERPEN of 17 August) that Belgium, as well as Germany, has already been confronted with nuclear smuggling.

"An uranium oxide tablet with a weight of 4.8 grams was seized in one case," Wathelet said. "The tablet, which came from a fuel needle probably of Russian origin, was in the possession of a Czech citizen," he added. According to our information, both the State Security service and the Nuclear Security service were brought in.

But that one flagrant case was not the end of the matter. In his extremely evasive response, Wathelet reported that the nine other cases were "attempted fraud." But nevertheless "quantities of uranium or plutonium were offered at exorbitant prices," the minister said. The attempted frauds were committed mainly by Zairians, "but in addition Poles, Italians, Britons, and Belgians" emerged with this material.

In an initial reaction, Geysels said he was not surprised by the smuggling activities. "This answer is the proof, although such trafficking has existed longer than the latest three years," he said. "As early as 1989, a case of illegal cesium smuggling was closed down in the Brussels Hilton hotel. And in 1992, there were arrests too." On each occasion Belgians were involved and the material came from western nuclear plants, Geysels said. Geysels wants to question the minister further. In the past, the State Security service has described attempts to smuggle nuclear material as all being presumed "pure fraud." But the service has set up information systems to monitor any possible smuggling of nuclear material.

German Interior Minister Manfred Kanther, speaking yesterday at the meeting of the Trevi group (the EU's justice and interior ministers) in Berlin, said that as yet there was no market for plutonium and other substances offered for sale illegally and that the 300 incidents of the last two years were only intended to test the market.

FRANCE

Ministers Decide To Intensify Plutonium Smuggling Checks

BR1908132294 Paris LE FIGARO in French
19 Aug 94 p 8

[Jerome Strazzulla report: "Wide Open Club of Plutonium Buyers"]

[Excerpts] The vastly expanding traffic in radioactive substances is likely to interest various countries, for different reasons. [passage omitted: speculation on interested buyers]

Nuclear Dealers

That leaves Europe. Except for a local terrorist group, Western Europe does not have much of a demand for what it already has, either directly or via alliance treaties. It is, however, a distribution platform for dealers in nuclear materials. So far, France has not uncovered any trafficking on its territory. Neither customs nor the Atomic Energy Commissariat (CEA) have reported a single incident. However, faced with the obvious prospect of being contaminated by trafficking that could be lucrative in the long term, the interior, environment, and budget ministers decided yesterday to intensify checks in France.

Minister on Nuclear Trafficking Prevention

BR3008120094 Paris LE FIGARO in French
27-28 Aug 94 p 6

[Interview with French Environment Minister Michel Barnier by Jerome Strazzulla; place and date not given: "Michel Barnier: 'France Is Not Protected From Nuclear Trafficking'"—first two paragraphs are LE FIGARO introduction]

[Text] In Germany there have been three seizures of plutonium 139 of Russian origin since May. In addition, 9.5 kg of uranium 136 were stolen from the Armazas-16 plant in Russia on Wednesday [24 August] and 600 bars of uranium oxide were found the same day in Estonia. Moreover, there is a Russian-German controversy about how serious the smuggling of nuclear materials is. While they are not comparable, these recent events all bear witness to a unique phenomenon: Western Europe is suddenly realizing that the most armed member of the five-member atomic bomb club (Footnote 1) (The members of the Nonproliferation Treaty: the United States, Great Britain, China, the former USSR, and France), the former Soviet Union, no longer has the airtight security which until now limited nuclear proliferation. Russia, which holds 49 percent of the world's military-grade plutonium, no longer seems able to control the movements of this stockpile.

Environment Minister Michel Barnier has broken France's silence on an issue which is mobilizing the West: What does international nuclear safety mean since the Pandora's box of Russia has threatened to open?

Strazzulla: Unlike other European countries, France seems to be displaying a serenity which strangely brings to mind the Chernobyl cloud incident. Does everything still stop at our borders?

Barnier: No! It is obvious that France is not spontaneously protected from trafficking in nuclear materials. There is no miracle protecting it. The fact that nothing has yet been found in our country does not exempt us from being vigilant and taking precautions. In view of recent events, I asked [Interior Minister] Charles Pasqua, [Budget Minister] Nicolas Sarkozy, and [Defense Minister] Francois Leotard to step up intervention by the police, customs officers, and the gendarmerie. The same type of policy, applied to the illegal export of toxic waste, has been having results for several months now. As Charles Pasqua said recently with regard to another case of terrorism, you will not find any fish unless you go fishing.

Strazzulla: However, plutonium's physical characteristics make it technically difficult to detect. Can customs checks be effective?

Barnier: In addition to checks, dismantling plutonium trafficking obviously calls for a more discreet effort by the intelligence services. This also assumes that the specialist services in the other European countries cooperate. The government wants to intensify a policy which has already been in place for several years. This is an absolute requirement, because here too plutonium trafficking proves that the environment knows no frontiers. However, the best preventive action to take is at the source and consists of setting up very stringent controls in order to stop all leaks of dangerous nuclear materials from the plants and laboratories which use them.

'Use Our Experience'

Strazzulla: The current political transition in the CIS has caused the collapse of its national security. What support can Western Europe give it?

Barnier: Nobody has the authority to give Russia lessons, but we can suggest that it use our experience. If it wants, we can help Russia set up what it seems to need most: a permanent system to account for its nuclear materials and a strong and independent authority to control it. In France, this inventory of nuclear materials, managed by the IPSN [French Nuclear Protection and Safety Institute], has so far allowed us to prevent or detect all theft or loss: The entire stockpile of nuclear materials on French soil is listed daily down to the milligram. This is done under the supervision of the Ministries of Defense and Industry, and under the control—at international level—of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Euratom. This is a reliable and precise system.

Strazzulla: Many years could pass before the CIS sets up a security policy. How do you see the transition phase?

Barnier: We will certainly not succeed in reducing the risks by pointing at the Russians and isolating them. Taking

account of the risk alone justifies a major cooperation effort. This is what Germany is doing. A country like ours must show that it is willing. Even if it means pointing our finger at countries, it seems to me to be more judicious to concentrate our efforts on the potential customers of this traffic.

Europe can make a joint response. This is one of the reasons why I asked [German Environment Minister] Klaus Toepfer, who chairs the Council of European environment ministers, to put trafficking in nuclear materials on the agenda of our next meeting.

Strazzulla: Disarmament agreements are going to enlarge the stocks of "free" plutonium considerably. What is France's position on the management of the world's plutonium?

Barnier: Obviously we must do everything to prevent it from being reused for military purposes by other countries. The French response is to reuse it in the civilian fuel cycle, rather than stock it. The MOX (Footnote 2) (A uranium-plutonium mixture which can be used as a fuel in certain reactors) used in France, for example, allows us to burn it. The priority objective of the plant at Creys-Malville is now to develop studies on fuel compounds which could allow us to understand how to reduce plutonium stocks within the framework of the CEA's [Atomic Energy Commission] CAPRA [expansion unknown] program.

Strazzulla: In just 40 years, the military and civilian nuclear sector has saturated the planet with hundreds of tonnes of plutonium waste. Does this situation inspire reflection in the environment minister of the world's leading atomic power country?

Barnier: It is truly a matter of great concern. The world electronuclear power supply system is weakened by the problem of the waste which it produces and which it does not yet know how to treat properly. France is working on this in accordance with the law of December 1991 on radioactive waste, which was passed almost unanimously by Parliament. Our country was right to obtain energy independence, but I am not in favor of an all-nuclear approach. We must seek out a better balance between atomic energy and renewable energies, as well as reviving an energy-saving policy.

GERMANY

BND Chief Assesses Nuclear Proliferation

AU1908114794 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German
19 Aug 94 p 4

["Excerpts" from "confidential" speech delivered by Konrad Porzner, chief of the Federal Intelligence Service, to the Bundestag Economic Policy Committee "in May": "Danger From the Crisis Arch"]

[Text] The mechanism of the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons is basically different from that of the proliferation of conventional weapons. Whereas conventional arms can be obtained from arms dealers, it has not been possible to date to buy nuclear,

biological, and chemical weapons. The far-reaching carrier vehicles, such as intermediate-range missiles, are currently only sold by North Korea.

A country that wants to equip itself with such weapons must therefore create the capacity for their production on its own. It must develop such weapons or acquire the relevant technical know-how and blueprints, and it must set up the production facilities required for building such weapons.

Since these arms projects are subject to secrecy or have to be kept secret for as long as possible, developments in connection with procurement are usually camouflaged. For these deals, cover addresses or forged end user certificates are used; deliveries are frequently channeled through third countries that are not involved.

An assessment of the relevance of proliferation requires information on the buyer countries....

Without going into detail on individual countries, I would like to make a few general statements on the current situation.

With the exception of North Korea, almost all countries seeking to get hold of nuclear weapons, biological or chemical weapons, and carrier systems form part of the crisis arc from North Africa to Southeast Asia. The availability of such weapons in some of these countries with, in part, governments that are not democratically legitimized, will even increase the instability in this region.

Proliferation efforts in this region are continuing. The tense situation has not relaxed in recent years. However, these countries' programs are progressing more slowly. This is presumably attributable to better export controls of the countries of origin producing dual use technologies.

In the area of nuclear weapons, Iraq has shown how to dodge international agreements and controls and thus obtain possession of nuclear weapons. In this region, as many as three countries—Pakistan, India, and Israel—are believed to have nuclear weapons.

Some of the countries in the crisis arc are or were trying to build facilities to develop or produce biological weapons. They were possibly encouraged by the example of Iraq, which has succeeded in keeping a large part of its biological weapons program secret from inspections of the UN Special Commission for the Destruction and Elimination of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The broad public was informed of the proliferation of chemical weapons when Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurdish population, in connection with developments regarding the chemical weapons factory near Al-Rabitah in Libya, and when a shipment of weapons-grade chemical products bound for Syria on board a German ship was seized in August 1992.

However, procurement activities in these countries are currently focused on missile technology. Almost all these countries proceed according to the same pattern in developing a missile program. At first, a well-tested system such as the Scud missile developed in the former USSR—and production facilities for it—will be bought. Subsequently,

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the range of this type of missile will be extended. At the same time, a modern solid fuel rocket will be developed and production facilities for such a rocket will be built. This is the way Iran proceeded. Currently, this approach is being watched in Libya, Syria, and Iran.

This is, briefly, the current situation, which shows that—contrary to hopes that have often been voiced—that the world has not become safer after the end of the East-West conflict.

The following trends are taking shape for the foreseeable future:

- In the future, the threat will emanate from carrier missiles in combination with nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads. It is true that it is not possible at this point to state the year when some country or another will definitely have operational carrier systems with ranges of approximately 1,000 km. There are too many unknown quantities to make a prediction. But generally, we are assuming a period early in the next decade....
- The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will continue, because we do not note any change in the behavior of the countries interested in having such systems.
- The number of suppliers of the required dual use technologies will increase because of the increasing industrialization of the world.
- Cooperation among the threshold countries will increase. In this connection, cooperation is conceivable between countries having nuclear weapons technologies, but no carrier systems, and those having such carrier systems, but no nuclear warheads.
- For simple goods such as weapons-grade chemical products or components for missile fuels and technically less ambitious machinery, suppliers will increasingly come from Third World countries.
- The collapse of the former USSR in particular has considerably increased the risk of proliferation. Interested consumers will find there everything they need—very many experts, blueprints of weapons systems, and materials that are hard to get, such as missile fuel components.

In this connection, the increasing number of incidents in which radioactive materials have been taken to the West is alarming. Some of these materials are very harmful to people's health. This must be assessed as an indication that there are no control mechanisms in the countries of origin.

This analysis shows what procurement efforts Germany will in the future be facing. Since experts and blueprints can be obtained more easily and at lower cost in other countries of the globe, demand in Germany will decrease. Germany and its neighbors are traditionally very efficient in the areas of civil engineering and measuring technologies. These will be the areas on which demand in the dual use field will in future be focused.

Here, special machines and facilities will be bought, and it will not be immediately clear whether they will be used in a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or missile

program, because they will not meet the characteristic condition of being "specially constructed." Such goods will be procured within the European Union and will be exported through the procurement networks of potential buyer countries, which are already working very cleverly today and will exploit the different control standards.

SPD Security Expert Says Nuclear Finds Only Tip of Iceberg

*LD1908084594 Berlin DDP/ADN in German
0515 GMT 19 Aug 94*

[Text] Cologne (DDP/ADN)—In the view of Social Democratic Party [SPD] security expert Egon Bahr, the incidents of nuclear smuggling which have been uncovered so far are only the tip of the iceberg. No one in the west imagined that the moral decay in Russia has reached a point where even weapons-grade plutonium is being sold, Bahr said on Deutschlandfunk today. He assumes that the plutonium that reaches customers in, for example, Iran or Iraq does not go on the indirect route via Germany. Not enough is known about this for the time being. The material which was found in Germany, in his view, is no coincidence because Germany could be a center for suppliers.

In this connection, Bahr criticized the insufficient help given by the west to Russia. They have not, for example, considered how the export of information about nuclear technology can be prevented. The planned trip by state minister Bernd Schmidbauer to Russia is only the "beginning of the beginning." A European or even an international establishment has to be set up to deal with this "global" concern.

DER SPIEGEL Says Munich Nuclear Seizure Includes Lithium-6

*LD2008082094 Berlin DDP/ADN in German
0203 GMT 20 Aug 94*

[Text] Hamburg (DDP/ADN)—The plutonium smuggling incident in Munich seems to have greater dimensions than originally supposed. The latest edition of the news magazine DER SPIEGEL reports that the investigators did not just seize 330 grams of plutonium at Munich airport the Wednesday before last; they are also said to have seized a container which, according to an analysis by the European Institute for Transuranium in Karlsruhe, contains up to one kilogram of the metal lithium-6. Lithium-6 is seen as an important element in the construction of hydrogen bombs. The plutonium seized is said to come from the Beloyarsk fast breeder reactor in western Siberia.

According to DER SPIEGEL, in a secret report by the Federal Intelligence Service submitted to the chancellor's office, it is assumed that the collapse of the former Soviet Union has "noticeably increased the risks of the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction." This applies not only to nuclear weapons, but also to biological and chemical warfare agents.

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Bavarian CID Confirms Lithium-6 Seizure

*LD2008094894 Berlin DDP/ADN in German
0921 GMT 20 Aug 94*

[Excerpt] Munich (DDP/ADN)—The Bavarian CID [LKA] has confirmed reports that a container with lithium-6 was found in addition to a few hundred grams of plutonium during the arrest of three nuclear smugglers at Munich airport on 10 August. An LKA spokesman today told DDP/ADN that a container with 200 grams of lithium was handed over in a Munich hotel during a deal instigated by contact men two days earlier. The spokesman was unable to say just how many grams were seized at the airport. There has been talk of a few hundred grams, he said. [passage omitted covered by referent item]

Kohl Again Seeks 'Decisive' Action Against Plutonium Trade

*LD2008190694 Berlin DDP/ADN in German
1809 GMT 20 Aug 94*

[Text] Hamburg (DDP/ADN)—German Chancellor Kohl is obviously afraid that the illegal trade in plutonium and uranium may get out of control. According to Sunday's WELT AM SONNTAG Kohl has written Russian President Yeltsin for the second time in two days calling on Moscow to take decisive action against the trade in plutonium and uranium. Yeltsin must make sure that no "fissionable material is roaming around the world," Kohl's letter reportedly states.

BND Official Denies Existence of 'Nuclear Mafia'

*AU2108175194 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 20-21 Aug 94 p 8*

[Interview with Paul Muenstermann, deputy president of the Federal Intelligence Service, by Dieter Schroeder; place and date not given: "To Our Knowledge, a Centrally Controlled Nuclear Mafia Does Not Exist"]

[Text]

Schroeder: Is the material that has been seized from "nuclear smugglers" so far just the "tip of the iceberg," as Russian nuclear expert Vladimir Chernosenko claims?

Muenstermann: Even if the quantities of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium discovered are still small, including the Munich case, the danger should not be underestimated. Like other observers, our experts think it is not unlikely that the material seized recently is just a small portion of the total material that is out there.

Schroeder: Are there any reliable estimates of undetected nuclear smuggling cases?

Muenstermann: No, we do not have any reports on that. Reliable figures are very difficult to obtain.

Schroeder: What information is there on such dirty business in other countries?

Muenstermann: The number of incidents involving illegal trading in nuclear materials has been on the increase since 1991. Radioactive material is usually taken to Central Europe from the CIS states via various routes. The dealers stick to their own interests, not to borders.

Just recently, 10 kilograms of smuggled uranium were seized in Turkey. Two kilos of highly enriched uranium were seized in Russia some time ago. But to our knowledge, weapons-grade material has only turned up in Germany so far.

Schroeder: Why have samples of nuclear material only emerged in Germany?

Muenstermann: Germany is by no means the only country where samples of illegally traded nuclear material have turned up. I just gave you two examples. But it is true that its geographical position makes Germany a center. Beside that, we also have a solid financial structure. Money is readily available here. The Federal Intelligence Service has been drawing attention to the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" for some time; we have been prepared for such incidents. This preparedness probably explains the high detection rate.

I personally pointed out the threat of "nuclear smuggling" and "nuclear terrorism" already in 1992. The general term used is nuclear proliferation.

Schroeder: What is your view on the charge that it was not until liaison people were brought into the smuggling scene or the nuclear mafia that a "supply market" occurred?

Muenstermann: The allegation that it was informers of the intelligence services and the police who started a supply market ignores the reality. There is a real supply market that the intelligence services have infiltrated to clarify what is going on there.

Schroeder: What do you know about the structure of that scene? Are there several small groups, or is it a major criminal organization?

Muenstermann: From what we know at the moment, these are individual perpetrators or groups, and we still have to find out whether they are organized in bigger units. We do not have any reliable information on that so far. The people who have been identified so far have done this for financial reasons.

Schroeder: Russian nuclear scientists and experts who have been reduced to poverty...? Can I put it that way?

Muenstermann: In view of the economic situation in the former Soviet Union, in the CIS, we must, indeed, consider the possibility of disappointed, jobless, and underpaid people within the military-industrial sector and among the members of the former power structure succumbing to the temptation of obtaining money that way.

Schroeder: So you would not necessarily speak of a nuclear mafia?

Muenstermann: No. Once we have found the individual suppliers and groups, we try to find out who is behind them. But in our view, there is no big, centrally controlled nuclear mafia.

Schroeder: Is it right that the German security authorities are ahead of other countries with regard to realizing the danger and "contacts" of such organizations?

Muenstermann: Clarifying nuclear proliferation is a top priority of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND). But

there are no "contacts" to such organizations. The BND clarifies nuclear proliferation abroad and obtains information on such cases.

You will understand that I cannot report any details, nor can I speculate on an alleged lead over other countries in this respect. But the successes we have achieved—which have been achieved in cooperation with the internal security authorities—do suggest that the authorities mentioned are highly competent.

Schroeder: Do you have any proof that the material originates from facilities in Russia and that it has come to Germany direct from there?

Muenstermann: Considering the circumstances of the Munich case and the analysis of the material seized, Russian origin is very likely.

Schroeder: Are the police and the intelligence services equipped appropriately for fighting "nuclear smuggling?"

Muenstermann: The Federal Intelligence Service does not fight nuclear smuggling, it clarifies such cases. Carrying out measures is the responsibility of the police.

The BND has the technical equipment and know-how for this task. I cannot say what the situation is like in the police force. But the recent successes indicate that the necessary measures have been taken there as well.

Schroeder: Could better results be achieved with better equipment or if the BND had more powers?

Muenstermann: All possibilities to improve clarification of nuclear proliferation are permanently being examined by the government and the authorities in charge. This goes for both technical equipment and the legal framework. Of course, intelligence service methods are also being improved as far as possible.

Schroeder: Have the successes achieved so far been due to a special strategy or was it coincidence?

Muenstermann: I cannot discuss every case. Where the BND was involved in clarifying nuclear proliferation, the successes are due to systematic planning and the use of intelligence service methods.

Schroeder: Is our knowledge based on our own research, or have there been leads by foreign intelligence services?

Muenstermann: Our knowledge in the field of nuclear proliferation is mainly based on our own findings. But leads we get from foreign intelligence services are certainly examined and used. It is a known fact that we have very good, cooperative relations with the Western intelligence services.

Schroeder: What is the cooperation with the Russian colleagues like?

Muenstermann: Cooperation with the Russian services is in the process of being established. I am sure that the visit to Moscow by the minister in the Chancellor's Office, Bernd Schmidbauer, will give new impetus to this cooperation and that he will achieve good results there.

Schroeder: With good cooperation, would it be possible to arrest plutonium dealers before they depart from Moscow and not wait until they get to Germany, as was the case in Munich?

Muenstermann: That is possible and desirable. We are, of course, directing our efforts at preventing such material from entering the FRG in the first place. That would be a very good result of our talks and efforts—if the nuclear, the dangerous material could be prevented from entering Germany.

Schroeder: Who do the liaison people pretend to be in their contacts with suppliers?

Muenstermann: I can not, of course, give you any details on the operational aspects of our work, because this might threaten the lives of these people.

Schroeder: Do you get any information on sources or wire-pullers from the suppliers?

Muenstermann: Our detection work certainly involves buyers and wire-pullers. There have not been any specific results there, though.

Schroeder: Are there any references to foreign states as buyers? How serious can relevant information provided by detained nuclear dealer Alfred Jackle be taken?

Muenstermann: We do not have any such references at the moment. In view of the amount of money Mr. Jackle has had available, foreign states cannot be excluded as buyers.

Schroeder: What information do you have on terrorist groups that could misuse weapons-grade nuclear material for their ends? Can such terrorist organizations be named?

Muenstermann: We do not have any specific findings on terrorist groups wanting to buy such material. They might exist, but they have kept their intentions well hidden so far. But we might hit on such information any time. Such developments cannot be ruled out. Yet: Even if sufficient weapons-grade material were available and if they succeeded in involving scientists, a nuclear bomb cannot be built in a basement laboratory. But terrorists could also try to spread highly poisonous and dangerous material among the population in some other way.

Schroeder: Why would suspected buyers, for instance from the Middle East, take the devious route via Germany?

Muenstermann: The BND does not have any definite findings on suspected buyers in the Middle East. As we all know, there are, however, several Third World countries that have openly stated an interest in nuclear weapons and nuclear technology. There are also states that conduct a very aggressive policy.

Why take the devious route via Germany? The activities of nuclear smugglers in Germany can mainly be explained by our central geographical position and our good infrastructure.

But it is also possible that the comparatively high detection rate creates the impression that Germany is the number-one target country for these activities.

Schroeder: What do you mean by "good infrastructure?"

Muenstermann: You can move very well here in Germany; both in terms of transport and because you have financial systems that work very well.

Schroeder: How well-informed are we about deficiencies in the security and control systems of Russian nuclear facilities?

Muenstermann: From all we know, we must conclude that security measures and precautions in Russian nuclear facilities could be improved, to put it mildly. The Western states that have the appropriate technology available can certainly support Russia in improving this situation.

Schroeder: Do you think that international controls of Russian nuclear facilities (both military and commercial) would be useful?

Muenstermann: First of all, Russia should take responsibility for security measures itself. But the West can give advice and support.

But to give such support and advice you need decisions on the political level. International control can only be realized on the political level and by mutual agreement. It is not a matter of blaming Russia, but of finding ways to stop security deficiencies and nuclear smuggling in a joint effort.

Schroeder: Ultimately, the problem can probably not be solved with the means of the intelligence service either.

Muenstermann: Very true. The primary aim of the upcoming talks will be plugging the leaks. Security precautions in Russia, or other countries from where the material is leaking, must become more effective. This should then stop such material from getting abroad, and especially to Germany.

Kinkel Interviewed on Plutonium Smuggling

AU2108200594

[Editorial Report] Mainz ZDF Television Network in German at 1710 GMT on 21 August in its "Bonn Direkt" program carries a 20-minute interview with Foreign Minister and Free Democratic Party of Germany (FDP) Chairman Klaus Kinkel by Klaus-Peter Sieglösch recorded at Kinkel's holiday resort on the island of Juist. [passage omitted on FDP's chances in upcoming elections.]

Turning to the recent incidents of plutonium smuggling, Kinkel notes that he "would not speak of impaired relations with Russia and the other countries concerned." He says that due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and disarmament entering a new phase nuclear material is roaming around, "not so much from the military field as from research facilities." He says that "controls must be improved with the help of Europe" and suggests that an international plutonium agency should be established. At first, he says, "controls must be improved by the countries themselves." He mentions a research institute in Moscow that was established on the initiative of former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and says that "personnel should be collected" and "nuclear technology should be put to civilian use" there. Euratom and Europol should also be involved in dealing with these issues.

When Sieglösch mentions that Russia has been denying that the material is of Russian origin, Kinkel says there is proof that "at least part of the material comes from Russia." [passage omitted on FDP-related political issues]

Commentary Warns of Mafia Involvement in Nuclear Smuggling

AU2208104494 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 20-21 Aug 94 p 4

[Commentary by Dieter Schroeder: "The Situation Is Not Yet Dramatic Enough"]

[Text] If a danger has been recognized, an old saying goes, it is already half banished. This, however, quite certainly does not apply to nuclear smuggling. The spectacular cases that have recently been discovered, particularly in Germany, are successes for the intelligence services and the police but they are not the beginning of a systematic combating of the illegal trade in weapons-grade material. Rather, limits that exist on the security services have become clear. In this field there is a criminal energy active and it cannot be kept in check by liaison people and policemen.

On the one hand there is an enormous number of possible suppliers, and on the other a group of powerful customers, including Third World states. There are reliable intelligence service findings on this. The nuclear dealer Alfred Jaekle, who was apprehended in Tengen on Lake Constance, managed to have \$100 million to buy the material for a nuclear bomb on the black market. For diplomatic reasons there is no official information about his customer. Therefore, one must guess which one of three states it could have been—Pakistan, North Korea, or Iraq. Relations between the FRG and Pakistan are so close that speculation about Pakistan is something of an embarrassment for Bonn.

In view of the size of this market and the danger, there is only one way out, namely to seal the leaks at the source in Russia and other CIS states. This, however, is a political not an intelligence service problem. State Minister Schmidbauer, coordinator of the intelligence services, will therefore not be able to limit his talks in Moscow to cooperation between the intelligence services.

One possibility would be to offer the Russians money and technical aid for the employment of unemployed nuclear scientists and for better security measures in the nuclear depots. This is partly already being done, together with Washington and the European Union, but effective aid would require means that the West is either unwilling or unable to provide. How difficult it is is shown by the so far rather inadequate efforts to compensate Ukraine for closing down the dangerous nuclear power station in Chernobyl. Another possibility would be to tighten control over the Russian nuclear cities and depots. The proposal to do this internationally has, however, already disappeared from the discussion. There is no great readiness for that in Moscow or among the Western nuclear powers. As soon as the keyword of international control is mentioned, the Russians immediately come up with the demand that this would have to be based on reciprocity. This means that not only the Americans, British, and French would have to

have their nuclear facilities inspected but also all states that use weapons-grade uranium or plutonium for civilian purposes. However, these states are not much interested in this. The permanent control apparatus necessary for that does not exist anyway.

Yeltsin's promise to cooperate with the West in combating the illegal nuclear trade does not, therefore, mean very much. In domestic policy he has to show consideration for two powerful groups, the representatives of the military-industrial complex and the nationalist opposition. Both are already now speaking of "provocations," "conspiracy," and "defamation." They reject the accusations and the demand for inspections. Even Yevgeniy Mikerin, deputy minister for nuclear energy, claimed in an interview that the West is making up the accusations to "foist help for the construction of new depots and the establishment of a new control system" on Russia. For Western suppliers this means contracts involving many millions.

Thus, the Western nations will have to say very quickly what the sealing of the leak in Russia is worth to them in terms of financial and political concessions. Yeltsin can wait for that calmly. For the time being, it is likely that nothing much will happen. Even though the situation is serious, as the political activities show, it will become dramatic only if a terrorist organization manages to get its hands on highly explosive and highly toxic nuclear material to blackmail a state. And this has not yet happened, also because building a bomb is quite difficult.

However, this is no reassurance. It might happen any day. It is far more difficult to deal with terrorist organizations than with states. One cannot wage war against them as against Iraq; one can hardly negotiate with them and buy off their threats, as in the case of North Korea. The least experiences seem to be still giving a false or deceptive feeling of safety to the Western nuclear nations. Furthermore, the Mafia has not yet intervened in the matter. For the time being, the business is not more than retail trading in raw materials. If the Mafia gets in on a large scale, one may even fear that entire bombs will appear on the market. Of course, the proposal to do without the entire military and civilian use of plutonium in the world does not help much, either. There is already too much of the stuff around.

ARD Says Nuclear Storage Depots 'Near' Country's Border

AU2308193194

[Editorial Report] Munich ARD Television Network in German at 1900 GMT on 22 August in its "Report" program carries a 10-minute report by Michael Mandlik on alleged secret depots for smuggled nuclear material outside Germany's eastern border and within Germany itself.

The report discusses the recent police action at Munich Airport, where police seized 350 grams of weapons-grade plutonium, uranium, and lithium, and arrested "three high-ranking mafiosi." Dieter Erich, a senior state prosecutor of Munich, emphasizes that unless police had taken action, the radioactive material "would now vagabond on

the federal territory or maybe in another country, and would be outside any state control."

The report then notes that most of the nuclear material smuggled into the country has "undoubtedly" come from Russian facilities, even though the responsible Russian authorities have vehemently denied that and described safety measures in their plants as "sufficient."

Mandlik states that ARD has "a Soviet document from 1989, in which former KGB head Kryuchkov describes in an usually self-critical way the enormous threat potential that existed even then as a result of the disappearance of nuclear material." Mandlik quotes from the document: "We regard the emerging nuclear terrorism as extremely dangerous. The fact is that several tonnes of enriched uranium have disappeared worldwide. Technically, it is not difficult to establish nuclear facilities, which means that individual groups could not only terrorize hundreds of cities but entire countries."

Mandlik states that, as early as 1987, the Bavarian Land Office of Criminal Investigations, LKA, set up a division that "focuses on tracking down the nuclear Mafia." The LKA's findings are "highly alarming." It is thought to be "certain" that the "nuclear dealers have established major nuclear depots near the German border. The goods are then sold in a similar manner to drugs. A courier, who travels to the place from far away in order to avoid suspicion, delivers the sample. Once the deal has been agreed, the material has to be supplied as quickly as possible. Otherwise the buyers will look for other supply sources."

Walter Nachreiner, investigator of the Bavarian LKA's nuclear investigation department, notes that "many hints we have received in connection with this issue clearly suggest that the supplier credibly asserts that the quantity that has been offered has already been stored here in Germany or is accessible here."

Michael Mandlik concludes that it must be feared that Germany is "no longer merely a center for illegal nuclear material but also a location for the storage of such material, which, moreover, is in the hands of unpredictable criminals."

Uwe Nerlich, a nuclear expert of the Science and Politics Foundation, states that as a result of the "close Iraqi-Russian relations" attention should "focus" on Iraq. Nerlich says that such countries will buy "anywhere" they can, and when such material is available in Germany one "can assume with certainty that they are active here."

Schmidbauer Says No Firm Proof of Nuclear Mafia

*LD2308212494 Berlin N-TV in German
1930 GMT 23 Aug 94*

[Excerpt]

Announcer: [passage omitted] Herr Schmidbauer, as far as you know, does a nuclear mafia exist? Can one talk about organized crime on this subject or is it just a matter of individuals acting on their own?

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Schmidbauer: What we have seen so far are many individuals acting on their own in several hundred cases in Europe—a number of individuals. Some individuals have already been put on trial in Germany for dealing in this material. There are groups—within the sphere of organized crime there are structures, arms dealers, gun runners—who are now also getting involved in this type of material. There are also indications that former secret services are behind these machinations. However, there is no evidence that central mafia structures are involved. That is a question for the cooperation with the Russians, namely what structures are behind this kind of sale, behind these kind of suppliers. It will be a while before it is quite clear whether mafia-like structures exist here or not. But there is no doubt that gang-related crime exists in this connection. [passage omitted]

Paper Reports Ministry Office Suspected of Nuclear Dealing

LD2308084094 Berlin DDP/ADN in German
0114 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] Hamburg (DDP/ADN)—The Cologne-based Federal Office of Foreign Trade Information, which is subordinate to the Federal Economics Ministry, is under suspicion of initiating deals involving the metal Lithium 6, which is used to make hydrogen bombs, as a result of carelessness. In a brochure published by the federal office at the end of last week, a state-run Chinese company seeks buyers for five kilos of the lithium isotopes 6 and 7 at a price of \$1.71 and \$1.81 million per kilo respectively, BILD newspaper (Tuesday edition) reports. Lithium-6 alarmed the authorities on 10 August when 500 grams of the rare isotope were also confiscated at Munich airport during the spectacular plutonium seizure.

However, Franz Wauschkunn, spokesman of the Federal Economics Ministry stressed to BILD: "The Li-6 and Li-7 offered is natural lithium. This natural lithium is not suitable for making nuclear weapons." On the other hand, Walter Seifritz, the renowned Swiss nuclear weapons expert noted that lithium-6 was a "substance that poses a fire risk." It was "made for one thing only—to produce hydrogen bombs and so-called super atomic bombs," Seifritz said. "You cannot use it for anything else."

Commentary Sees Danger of Nuclear Smuggling Overestimated

AU2408113294 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 24 Aug 94 p 4

[Commentary by Josef Joffe: "Bombs Bazaar Germany?"]

[Text] A lot of nonsense is being said about plutonium, lithium, and "the bomb" these days. One of them is that plutonium is the most poisonous substance on earth. It is right that it is the heaviest (natural) element, twenty times heavier than water. Anyone lifting up a cube containing a liter of the substance is running a risk of dropping the surprisingly "heavy" 20-kilo thing, which might then crush their feet. The radioactivity will not kill them, because alpha rays lack the ability to permeate substances. One should avoid breathing in plutonium dust as tiny amounts could lead to lung cancer—which is, however, disputed in the relevant literature.

The same applies to lithium-6, a kilogram of which was recently seized in the FRG. A popular paper immediately quoted an expert as claiming: "Incredible... highly dangerous substance... only used for the building of the hydrogen bomb...." Lithium is used for a number of things—such as alloys and batteries. The lithium-6 salt gets interesting only in connection with deuterium (as Li6-D): In hydrogen and "pushed" atom bombs it effects the rapid flow of neutrons. But: It was not that bomb material that had landed at Munich airport; and the Chinese do not offer this in the open market either (as reported), they only offer lithium-6.

But this is not a chemistry lesson; it is about how to handle a serious problem. Undisputed facts first. A good thing, namely nuclear disarmament, is confronting us with a worse problem every day. Some 2,000 warheads must be destroyed each year by the United States and Russia; what remains is plutonium cores the size of a fist, totalling 100 metric tons a year. (A highly qualified bomb builder makes do with five pounds; a simple do-it-yourselfer needs 18).

This historic irony—disarmament as a nightmare—is a fact. What is more complicated is evaluating the events in Germany. A few micrograms here, as much as 300 grams there—these plutonium seizures have really fired the apocalyptic imagination. The Federal Intelligence Service talks about the "desolate" economic situation of the former Soviet Union, the "powerlessness" of the state, the "corruption" of security authorities—and all of a sudden a horrific picture emerges where the FRG, of all places, becomes a center where everyone can buy bomb material made in Russia: gangsters, terrorists, states.

Possible, but not likely. But it has been an open secret in Germany for some time now that the story about the market—growing supply there, soaring demand here—is not true. The Bremen Public Prosecutor notes unemotionally: There is no evidence that a real plutonium market exists in Germany. "The European market," a German expert concludes "consists almost entirely of liaison men." What is there are gamblers, amateurs—and decoys installed by the state, who pretend that there is a market in order to shine with rapid investigation successes or to suggest an atmosphere of danger, which is very well suited for increasing state powers. This bizarre situation is crying out for a parliamentary investigation committee.

No, terrorists and states will not get the bomb in the German "bazaar." Carlos or the Hezbollah could not build a bomb with all the plutonium in the world. This needs the know-how, machinery, and skills that are only available in countries like Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. It cannot be done in a garage. Terrorists can do it more simply, cheaply, and quite legally: with diesel and fertilizer. Just remember the attack by Islamic terrorists on the World Trade Center in New York, where this mixture tore a 60-meter hole. And the would-be nuclear powers? They are not interested in a few kilos. Unless they want to provoke a preventive blow, what they need is not a bomb but an entire, well-hidden arsenal. That requires hundreds of kilos; and these are not available at German airports, but maybe in Russia.

The only thing is: Just like any other nuclear power, Russia is not interested in sharing its illustrious nuclear status

with others. Just like the West, the Russians want to plug the leaks, although they fiercely reject Bonn's allegations that the plutonium pipeline starts in Russia. That is a solid basis for a discussion on plugging leaks.

There are ways and means. The first thing that is needed is a registration system; nobody in Russia knows exactly what fissionable material is where. Then they can install technical systems with the help of the West that sound an alarm in the event of illegal handling. Incidentally, the big stores—the military ones—are still being carefully controlled. The problem is the laboratories and the reactors. And there, Western funding for legitimate research is a better incentive than amateur smuggling. So far, it has just been a matter of drops, not of floods. With a lot of money and good will dams can be built; the problem must be worth it to us and the Russians.

Kinkel Urges Establishing International 'Plutonium Regime'

LD2408113394 Berlin DDP/ADN in German
1024 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Bonn (DDP/ADN)—Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel is urging the creation of an international "plutonium regime" to combat the illegal trade in nuclear material. At all costs there should be no "revival of the nuclear terror" with totally unpredictable parameters, Kinkel today told the German Society for Foreign Policy in Bonn. If necessary, the UN Security Council must take up the issue of this serious threat to international security.

Kinkel points out that in a letter to his counterparts in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, he makes clear the seriousness of the situation. It is particularly important that Moscow should be prepared to cooperate.

Basque ETA Involvement in Plutonium Deal Alleged

AU2408082294 Hamburg BILD in German
24 Aug 94 pp 1, 2

[Einar Koch report: "Sensational Revelation: Nuclear Smuggling"]

[Text] Has the nightmare long become reality?

BILD has learned from highly secret investigation records that terrorists are probably involved in the dirty business of plutonium smuggling.

According to Federal Intelligence Service [BND] information, the two Spaniards arrested at Munich Airport on 10 August with 300 grams of plutonium, Equia Oroz (49) and Arratibel Bengoechea (60), have excellent connections to the Basque terror organization ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty].

In addition: With all probability, the plutonium originated in the secret Russian nuclear city "Tomsk-7." But the Russian authorities have firmly denied this so far.

The nuclear deal proceeded as follows. On 22 July, Benitez Torres, a Colombian living in Moscow, and the Basque Bengoechea met with a client interested in plutonium at a Munich hotel. The "business partner" was a liaison man at

the Bavarian Land Office of Criminal Investigations, which had planted a video camera in the hotel room. The camera was running.

All three men quickly reached a deal over four kilograms of pure plutonium. The price: \$265 million in cash!

The liaison man kept the plutonium dealers at bay with a bank guarantee of \$100 million.

On 23 July, the Colombian departed, probably for Berlin. The Basque remained in Munich and stayed in touch with the liaison man.

On 24 July, the Colombian returned from Berlin on the Inter City Express, and on 25 July he offered the liaison man 3 grams of plutonium. The investigators fear that the nuclear material comes from a dealer cache in Germany.

On 10 August, 300 grams of plutonium were flown from Moscow to Munich in a Lufthansa aircraft. It was confiscated by investigators.

Under interrogation, the Colombian explained that the nuclear material originated in the Russian "Tomsk-7" nuclear plant.

The investigators are particularly worried about the connections with the ETA. An official told BILD: "If the ETA is really behind the deal, it means that terrorists have long been involved in plutonium smuggling. Either they themselves have enough plutonium to build a bomb, or they want to improve their war budget."

Paper Reports Nuclear Material Also From German Sources

AU2408090694 Berlin DIE WELT in German
24 Aug 94 p 1

[Report by Peter Scherer: "Nuclear Smuggling: Uranium Also From German Sources"]

[Excerpt] Frankfurt/Main—International nuclear smugglers had access to uranium and strontium from German sources last year. This emerges from police investigations, which found that there were at least two incidents where "the radioactive material seized came from the FRG." The material involved was "measuring and control emitters with strontium-90 sources" and "a cylindrical metal object containing parts of uranium-235."

Juergen Stollenow of the Federal Office of Criminal Investigations yesterday confirmed these seizures made in Thuringia in October last year to DIE WELT. He said the material found was "radioactive sources for control devices" that had been "found" when a company was wound up by the Trust Agency. In another incident, the material found was a so-called "biological weapons detector" from the Russian forces stationed in eastern Germany. The substances found were strontium-90, uranium-235, and thorium.

It is unclear whether Germany will continue to play a central role as "mediator or supply market." Security experts do not rule out the possibility that the enormous pressure on authorities to investigate might be leading to a "suppression effect" in other countries. Thus, a nuclear

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smuggler arrested in Helsinki said that because of police activities there the FRG was avoided in the deal.

According to the private television station RTL, traces of the latest German plutonium find in Munich lead to Iraq. Iraq's Saddam Husayn is buying weapons-grade nuclear material in Western Europe, and particularly in Germany. According to the television station, relevant documents have been found by the police. [passage omitted]

Article Views Speculation on Plutonium Smuggling Issue

AU2608153094 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German
26 Aug 94 p 4

[Article by Wolfgang Hoffmann: "Care was Neglected"]

[Text] Before Secretary of State Bernd Schmidbauer, the Chancellery Office's coordinator for the work of the secret services, had left his aircraft in Moscow, the number two in the Federal Intelligence Service [BND], Paul Muenstermann, had already decided who would be on Schmidbauer's reception committee. In an interview for SÜD-DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Muenstermann rejected speculations by various Christian Democratic Union [CDU] politicians about a Russian nuclear mafia and rebuffed attempts to lay the blame at Moscow's door. "The point is not to make accusations vis-a-vis Russia, but to remove security shortcomings and stop the nuclear smuggling together," he said.

This appeasement was urgently necessary because Moscow was considerably irritated by the recent case of plutonium smuggling in Bavaria, with its loud implications about the Russians' slovenly handling of fissionable bomb-grade materials. Shortly before Schmidbauer's visit, the chief of the Chancellery Office, Friedrich Bohl, made an energetic appearance as a strong man from the banks of the Rhine. "Things cannot continue this way," Bohl publicly told the Russians.

If the agreement Schmidbauer reached in Moscow is altered, the Bavarian police will hardly be able to deploy any more liaison men in Russia in order to purchase nuclear weapons material there. Regardless of the fact that this would create a market for such material, it would contradict not just the spirit, but also the content of the 10-point memorandum adopted by Schmidbauer and the Russian intelligence chief Sergey Stepashin.

The purpose of the agreement is "close cooperation in combating international organized crime, international organized illegal trade in radioactive and nuclear materials, and international terrorism." But the memorandum does not contain anything that could not already have been achieved through informal channels. For many years, both the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Atomic Energy Community have been demanding additional control and supervision mechanisms.

The Federal Government could have adapted itself to the danger of nuclear smuggling much earlier, on the basis of its own experience with the possible misuse of nuclear materials. In 1988, there were suspicions that weapons-grade nuclear material had been removed from the nuclear plants in Hanau and had got into the wrong hands. But as

soon as the issue had died down, the dangers of a misuse of fissionable materials were dismissed. When the U.S. expert Paul Leventhal told the Hanau Nuclear Investigations Committee that one single illegal morsel of weapons-grade plutonium would be "sufficient to alter the course of history," he was laughed at by coalition deputies.

The same treatment has been accorded to the Social Democratic Party of Germany's [SPD] demands to form a supervisory body patterned on the American NEST (Nuclear Emergency Search Team). Today, the SPD parliamentarian Hermann Bachmaier says: "The formation of such a team, which could be expertly deployed immediately, has been neglected."

Indeed, such a team, consisting of experts equipped with the necessary gadgetry, would be extremely useful today. The land criminal investigation offices, which are responsible for counteracting dangers, refer to the authorities responsible for nuclear monitoring. But the latter authorities are neither equipped for counteracting nuclear dangers nor are they responsible for it. There is no central coordination.

The information that Bonn issues on the subject of nuclear incidents is also confusing at times. The coordinator for the work of the secret services talks of 300 known nuclear incidents in the whole of Europe, whilst the Federal Criminal Investigation Office talks of 241 such cases in Germany alone since 1991. And after the Munich police had over-hastily declared the radioactive contraband as weapons-grade, U.S. experts, from a country far better equipped to deal with these matters than the Germans, reached a different conclusion: The material was not weapons-grade.

The nonchalance displayed so far is in direct contrast with the panic displayed in Bonn and Moscow over the latest incidents. It is not without justice that SPD deputy Bachmaier, who, as a legal politician in his faction, has dealt with the problem of nuclear proliferation for many years, claims that the Federal Government is taking advantage of the plutonium smuggling for election purposes, and applying pressure on the laender to vote for the law on the combating of crime that was blocked by the Senate. This law's restrictive provisions, such as extended telephone-bugging, are a further step toward a supervised society, but they can hardly do anything to prevent nuclear misuse.

Whenever new dangers arise, Bonn is always quick to restrict basic rights. That is a bad alternative to timely action appropriate to the danger at hand. If the CDU now adds a few sentences to its election program on the subject of combating nuclear crime and promises that "controls will be increased in Germany," it will be indirectly admitting that the government in its own country has neglected to do that which could have been done without tampering with basic rights in the first place.

Possible 'Undercover Agent' Involvement in Smuggling Needs Clarification

LD2608134294 Berlin DDP/ADN in German
1242 GMT 26 Aug 94

[Text] Bonn (DDP/ADN)—SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] Chairman Rudolf Scharping says the SPD

insists that the circumstances surrounding the nuclear smuggling cases in Germany must be clarified. Questions concerning the possible involvement of undercover agents or secret services have not been satisfactorily answered, Scharping said in Bonn today.

At the same time he rejected calls by the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] that he should apologize for the attacks by SPD federal business manager Guenter Verheugen. The latter expressed the view that the discovery of plutonium in Munich could have been stage-managed by the government. Scharping stressed that the matter could not be settled by the "somewhat primitive attacks on the opposition." Clarification should be sought totally separated from any election campaign squabbling.

Bavarian Minister Rejects Russian Allegations

LD3108150794 Berlin DDP/ADN in German
1402 GMT 31 Aug 94

[Text] Munich (DDP/ADN)—Bavarian Interior Minister Guenther Beckstein rejected accusations from the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry in connection with the discovery three weeks ago of an attempt to smuggle 350 grams of weapons-grade plutonium. The seizure of the radioactive material was "clearly not attributable to demand," Beckstein said in Munich on Wednesday. Georgiy Kaurov, spokesman for the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry, told the magazine STERN that the plutonium was "placed on board the Lufthansa plane in Munich by the German secret service in order to discredit Russia."

In the middle of July the Bavarian regional criminal investigations office, which is responsible for combating illegal trade in radioactive material, learned that a group of suspects in Munich wanted to sell a largish quantity of plutonium, the Bavarian interior minister responded. The offered supply of such material was the first signal for the authorities to move into action. Until the seizure on 10 August there were significant indications that the dangerous material or parts of it were already in Germany.

The accusations by the Russian Atomic Ministry were "couched in such a way that they need no commenting on," Beckstein added.

Undercover Agent Says Nuclear Material Obtainable in 48 Hours

AU0709064694 Munich FOCUS in German
5 Sep 94 pp 32-34

[Interview with an unidentified undercover agent by Josef Hufelschulte; place and date not given: "100 Grams of Plutonium in Secret Depots"]

[Text]

Hufelschulte: In some sectors of the public, agents and undercover agents of the police have recently been considered bad boys who fan trade with radioactive material, thus creating an artificial market in Germany. Is that right?

Undercover agent: This is an impertinence. We do not procure anything that is not available. The material is there and is more or less available on call.

Hufelschulte: If it is as simple as that, why are people like you needed at all?

Undercover agent: To ensure that these goods do not fall into the wrong hands. The agents must constantly have access to these circles and maintain contact in order to keep the goods under control.

Hufelschulte: How fast can you procure nuclear material?

Undercover agent: Uranium-235 or Caesium-137, for example, can be obtained within 48 hours. A telephone call is sufficient.

Hufelschulte: How fast can you procure plutonium for me?

Undercover agent: I will not procure any plutonium for you at all. I only furnish proof that it is available—but only for the police.

Hufelschulte: How fast?

Undercover agent: I can provide plutonium within four weeks.

Hufelschulte: How much?

Undercover agent: Approximately 100 grams. If someone wants more, I would have to have it fetch it from the East Bloc. However, I would not do that.

Hufelschulte: Does that mean that 100 grams of plutonium are stored here?

Undercover agent: Yes, it is stored here in secret depots. In the greater Dresden area, such a depot used to exist. There are other depots in Austria, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania.

Hufelschulte: Who is in charge? Who are the nuclear dealers?

Undercover agent: The real masterminds are high-ranking military officials from the former East Bloc states, including generals. And of course members of secret services—the Stasi, but also the secret services from Prague, Bucharest, Sofia, and St. Petersburg. Moreover, one should not forget the nuclear scientists!

Hufelschulte: We are very curious—which professor is a secret nuclear dealer?

Undercover agent: To make one thing clear: I will not mention any names. Yet, I tell you that scientists of the Moscow Karpov Institute were involved in the deals between 1992 and 1993.

Hufelschulte: Are their names known?

Undercover agent: Yes. Their names are mentioned in the files of German investigation authorities.

Hufelschulte: Where can one meet this criminal scene? And how can one establish contact with the nuclear dealers and smugglers?

Undercover agent: That is quite simple. Money is the key. It is true that money rules the world. If you have money, you will sooner or later also get the required contacts. If you know how to move in the circle of nuclear smugglers, you will then meet the right people—in some exclusive hotel. It is as simple as that.

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Hufelschulte: How often did you help the police?

Undercover agent: Very often. Six times my help led to arrests and sentences.

Hufelschulte: You must be really good...

Undercover agent: I do not act on my own, you need a team.

Hufelschulte: Who is your partner?

Undercover agent: A criminal officer, an undercover agent.

Hufelschulte: Can you describe such an undercover operation?

Undercover agent: First I find the people who want to sell nuclear material. Once they have taken the bait, I introduce my partner. I tell them that he has a lot of money. Then the dealers meet with him. At a certain point, the police come in and they are arrested. I have carried out such operations several times with my partner.

Hufelschulte: After the arrest of the plutonium couriers at Munich airport, investigations by the criminal police revealed that a total of 4 kilograms of plutonium were to be supplied. Did you know about this deal, too?

Undercover agent: I have known the two Spaniards and the Colombian who were arrested in Munich since the summer of 1992. Osmium and red Mercury were involved at the time. I met with them several times in Switzerland. Several land offices of criminal investigation know about that. Through these channels, the Munich Office of Criminal Investigation received information and established contact with these people.

Hufelschulte: You worked for several offices of criminal investigation as an undercover agent. Where did you feel most protected?

Undercover agent: The offices of criminal investigation in Stuttgart and Munich provide good protection. However, it is hands off the offices of criminal investigation in the laender governed by the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD].

Hufelschulte: Are you participating in the election campaign?

Undercover agent: No. Yet I claim that one can easily be left in the lurch in SPD-governed laender.

Hufelschulte: What does that mean?

Undercover agent: If one is unfortunate, one may suddenly receive a knock on the head. One may suddenly be facing a trial.

Hufelschulte: Why do you work as an undercover agent? What are your personal motives? Is it money?

Undercover agent: I have never received any money. I have only had expenses—1,500 German marks in three years. I am more interested in ideas.

Hufelschulte: Thus, you are waging some kind of private war against the nuclear mafia?

Undercover agent: You may describe it this way. In any case, I want to contribute to making life difficult for these gangsters.

Hufelschulte: You are leading a dangerous life.

Undercover agent: Yes, the forest is big...

Hufelschulte: What do you mean?

Undercover agent: Of course people disappear sometimes and are buried in the forest or discovered in the Danube.

Hufelschulte: Have you ever received a threat?

Undercover agent: I once received an envelope that contained nothing but a ball.

Hufelschulte: Do you feel sufficiently protected?

Undercover agent: I know my risk. However, it is incredibly mean if someone reveals your identity on purpose. DER SPIEGEL recently threatened to publish my complete name. This is intimidation. What is the point? My wife's nerves are now worn to a frazzle.

Schmidbauer Says Russia To Dispose Of Plutonium Seized in Munich

AU0109104294 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 1 Sep 94 p 1

["ky"-attributed report: "Moscow To Dispose of Plutonium Seized at Munich Airport"]

[Text] Bonn—According to Intelligence Service Coordinator Bernd Schmidbauer (Christian Democratic Union), Russia is prepared to take over and dispose of the 300 grams of plutonium-239 seized at Munich airport at the beginning of August. The state minister in the Chancellor's Office told SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG that Moscow has decided to take this step "irrespective of the material's origin."

Schmidbauer did not say anything on the plutonium's origin. He said, however, that since the conclusion of his talks with the head of the Russian intelligence service, Stepashin, "things are seen much more clearly." The state minister welcomed the fact that Russian President Boris Yeltsin wants to lay down the cooperation of the two countries on fighting nuclear smuggling in a decree. Yeltsin and Chancellor Helmut Kohl discussed the topic in Berlin on the occasion of the farewell ceremony for the Russian troops.

Schmidbauer once again demanded closer controls of nuclear facilities "worldwide." This is primarily the task of the individual states, but he can also imagine an "international information service with control possibilities." What is decisive is that radioactive material is seized in the country of origin. The intelligence service coordinator said that biological and chemical weapons are an "enormous problem." The "transfer of technical know-how" to states such as North Korea or Iraq must be prevented. But he has no information on this kind of "rogue material," Schmidbauer said.

Uranium Seized in Berlin 'Is Not Weapons Grade'*LD1209141894 Berlin DDP/ADN in German
1325 GMT 12 Sep 94*

[Excerpt] Schoenefeld (DDP/ADN)—The uranium seized at [Berlin's] Schoenefeld Airport is not weapons grade. The Potsdam police announced in Potsdam today after detailed investigations that the material was several hundred grams of granules of uranium ore, known as pitchblende.

The material was examined by specialists from the environmental office in Frankfurt (Oder) who said its low radiation was not dangerous to humans. [passage omitted]

NORWAY**Security Reinforced To Prevent Nuclear Material Smuggling***BR2208105194 Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian
18 Aug 94 p 6*

[Article by Erik Sagflaot: "Increase in Smuggling of Nuclear Material Threatens Europe"]

[Excerpt] The Norwegian customs authorities have also sharpened their state of alertness following a series of disclosures regarding the smuggling of radioactive material from Russia to Germany. The security measures imposed around Russian nuclear plants have virtually broken down.

On Thursday [18 August], for the fourth time in just a few months, the German police uncovered an attempt to dispose of radioactive substances that can be used to produce atomic bombs. In three cases the substance involved was Plutonium-239, in one instance it turned out to be Uranium-235. It can only be a question of time before the lack of control over Russian nuclear materials leads to the spread of atomic weapons to countries one would rather see without such a capacity, or until criminals use these super-toxic substances to practice large-scale blackmail.

Tighter Control

"Customs checks in Finnmark have been stepped up considerably as a result of the general development in Russia," Information Chief Bjorn Sandnes of the Customs Directorate told ARBEIDERBLADET. "That applies with regard to both staff and equipment. As far as equipment is concerned, it has also been taken into account that we must be able to monitor the possibility of radioactive material being smuggled. In addition, an agreement has been reached with the Civil Defense Force to cooperate with respect to the equipment used for such monitoring, because their equipment is more advanced than ours."

Sandnes said that there are plans to give staff additional training in detecting potential attempts to smuggle radioactive material. [passage omitted]

Customs Try To Prevent Plutonium Smuggling*BR3108151294 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
29 Aug 94 p 13*

[Article by Kjell Dragnes: "Radioactive Contraband"]

[Excerpts] The illegal and lethal trade in radioactive substances has set alarm bells ringing in the West. The

Norwegian customs authorities are tightening their checks in the north in an attempt to prevent any such smuggling there. Meanwhile, plutonium is "leaking" out of a Russian nuclear industry plunged into chaos, and nuclear disarmament has merely complicated the situation even further.

The highly toxic substance plutonium has been smuggled out of Russia and attempts have been made to sell it through intermediaries in Germany. The buyers remain unknown, but nations such as Pakistan and North Korea have been named. Pakistan denies that it ordered the delivery of the contraband. Terrorist groups are another possibility.

The name plutonium derives from the name of the king of the underworld, Hades in Greek mythology (also called Pluto). Pluto means "the prosperous—giver of wealth." Meanwhile, the worldly underworld in Russia and the West are trying to make themselves richer by selling plutonium. This could create a hell on Earth. [passage omitted]

The suitcase was quite an ordinary one, but it contained neither clothes, shoes, nor legal commercial samples. The contents were 350 grams of plutonium-239 concealed in a lead-lined steel container. Plutonium can be used in the production of nuclear weapons. The passenger concerned, one Justiniano Torres, was arrested, and two Spaniards who were due to meet him were also detained.

It was 10 August 1994.

On 12 August 1994, in Bremen, German police officers arrested a German citizen who was offering 0.05 milligrams of plutonium for sale.

Also on 12 August in Kaliningrad (Koenigsberg), Russian police arrested three Russians who were trying to sell a 60-kg container of radioactive material taken from geological equipment.

On 19 August, two Russians were arrested in the nuclear town called Arsamas 16 while attempting to steal 10 kg of uranium.

On 22 August 1994, in Moscow, Germany and Russia signed a cooperation agreement aimed at preventing the smuggling of nuclear material.

All this has happened over the last three weeks. Back in May, further attempts had been made to sell radioactive material—both plutonium and enriched uranium, in Germany. So far, only small amounts have been involved, although even small amounts of plutonium can be extremely dangerous. However, unlike a series of incidents that took place over the last two years, when the radioactive material on offer turned out to be a hoax, or which involved material that cannot be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, this time the material in question is the real thing. That is why the alarm bells are ringing. [passage omitted]

Even if the Russian authorities also see the danger, they deny that it is looming. Sergey Stepachin, the head of the Russian counterespionage organization FSK, stated during the recent visit by FBI Chief Louis Freeh that there was no proof that the Mafia was trying to sell nuclear weapons. When German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's intelligence coordinator Bernd Schmidbauer was in Moscow last week

he repeated the same message. Probably smaller groups are behind the smuggling attempts.

Furthermore, the Russian military maintains that its nuclear weapons are "under seven seals." The Deputy Head of the Missile Force, Lieutenant-General Vladimir Alekseyevich Nikitin said in an interview with the newspaper RED STAR that the monitoring of such weapons is both stringent and effective.

Western experts admit the Russians are right in saying that so far there have been no gross examples of the theft and smuggling of military material from Russian military bases. Rather, the stolen material comes from sources such as test reactors, or the medical or metallurgical industries. However, in the light of the chaotic situation predominating within the Russian nuclear industry, there is an impending danger of criminals getting their hands on some plutonium or other radioactive material.

Sergey Novikov, the deputy head of the watchdog body Gosatomnadsor admitted as much last week, when he said: "We have uncovered a large number of thefts of radioactive material." Meanwhile, the Ministry for Nuclear Affairs, or Minatom, maintains that checks have shown that no "weapons-grade material" has been taken.

Chaos

In 10 former secret nuclear towns, previously privileged and highly educated people are living on low wages or receiving no pay at all—nor the provisions they were so used to getting in the good old days. Whereas the main worry used to be that non-nuclear nations would "buy" Russian experts and develop their own weapons, the main concern now is that sloppy routines for performing checks could tempt some residents in these towns to steal and sell radioactive substances.

The major disarmament program which the United States and Russia have agreed to implement is making the problem even more acute. Plutonium is a fundamental part of a warhead that is now being removed and placed in storage. Over a 10-year period, 100 tonnes of plutonium is to be removed from warheads in each country. Nuclear reactors in both countries will produce an additional 110 tonnes.

Russian and U.S. authorities have a diametrically opposed view on plutonium. Minatom chief Viktor Mikhailov believes that plutonium is the energy source of the future, for use in fast-breeder reactors when today's supply of uranium, used up in normal reactors, has been exhausted. Consequently, the several hundred tonnes that Russia has in its possession will therefore be looked upon as a solid bank account.

The United States views things differently. Breeder reactors are expensive to build and operate, and plutonium is not something to be counted on. However, at the risk of complicating the picture even further, the nuclear powers Great Britain and France see eye to eye with Moscow regarding plutonium. Japan, with its energy deficit, is counting heavily on nuclear power, and sees things in the same way as the other three countries.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimates that approximately 100 tonnes of plutonium are produced

around the world, for the most part in Great Britain, France, and Russia. Whereas the United States stopped extracting plutonium from used reactor fuel rods 17 years ago, both Great Britain and France have invested in its extraction, so-called reprocessing.

This has given rise to a twofold problem: First, nonnuclear powers can use plutonium from the civil sector to make atom bombs; and second, growing international trade in and transportation of these hazardous substances is increasing the danger of their being stolen.

Leaks

However, for the time being it is not that is feared most, but rather "leaks" from Russia, for there is a large number of potential customers.

Germany is particularly bent on preventing any fissile material from being smuggled in. Paradoxically enough, the major operations launched by the German police have contributed toward creating a false market. Many of the reported incidents were due to policemen or journalists posing undercover as dealers in order to blow the lid off of the trade in nuclear material.

However, Germany is pressing on and wants all EU countries to become involved in comprehensive cooperation. Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel intends to take up the question during the meeting of the European Council of foreign ministers scheduled for next month, and also wants the United Nations to debate the problem.

The 1968 nonproliferation agreement is due to be revised next year. In it, the nuclear powers undertake not to disseminate knowledge or materials to nonnuclear powers. However, many of the latter claim that this is discriminatory against them, and are opposed to being dictated to in this way by the five self-proclaimed nuclear powers. Perhaps they are out on the black market, where terrorists armed with money may be offering a good price. [passage omitted]

Can Terrorists Build the Bomb?

In principle, yes. The technological solutions to the problem of constructing an atom bomb are relatively simple; the processes involved are familiar from everyday physics textbooks. However, theory is one thing, and practice is quite another. More than a little enriched uranium, or plutonium, is required to make an atom bomb, as experience from Iraq and North Korea shows—both being countries which had their own nuclear programs for many years. North Korea has continued with its program, Iraq has been more stringently monitored ever since the Gulf War.

The difference is that countries wishing to obtain nuclear weapons—called threshold countries, because they have the technology to do so—are intent on building up a store of weapons that must be capable of being put to military use. Consequently, the weapons must not be too large to prevent them from being launched by missile or from aircraft, they must be ready for use at any given moment, and they must therefore be frequently maintained. This sounds simple, but is actually complicated.

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Terrorists will have a quite different viewpoint. Their bomb does not need to be particularly advanced, and they will be able to achieve their aim even if the bomb does not "function" entirely as planned. However, they will also be dependent on a certain quantity of fissile material, laboratories that do not ask too many questions, and advanced electronics that cannot be purchased over the counter today. They will also need specialists, nuclear physicists, and chemists. So far there have not been too many of these on the open market.

One Kg Is Enough

Scholars disagree as to how much is required to produce a "terrorist bomb." In Russia and the United States, the experts use approximately 2.7 kg of plutonium-239 to make one small bomb. Many people believe that terrorists would need at least 8 kg of plutonium or 25 kg of uranium-235.

However, one independent U.S. group of experts, the Natural Resources Defense Council, believes that 50 years of development and research mean that far less plutonium or uranium is needed. Consequently, they believe that the international danger threshold for plutonium should be reduced from eight kg to one kg.

One physicist in the group, Thomas B. Cochran, believes that one kg of plutonium is enough to make a bomb with an explosive force equivalent to 1000 tonnes of TNT. The force of the Hiroshima bomb was 15,000 tonnes.

British nuclear physicist Frank Barnaby, who worked at the Swedish peace studies institute SIPRI for many years, believes that there is not even any need to work with pure plutonium, claiming that 35 kg of plutonium oxide in a metal container, surrounded by a high explosive, like Semtex and approximately 40 electronic detonators simultaneously delivering a pulse of 4,000 volts, could result in a crude form of fission that would result in an explosion equivalent to 100 tonnes of TNT. And even if this failed to happen, the conventional explosive would spread highly toxic plutonium—with a very long half-life—over a large area.

A quantity of 0.5 micrograms is enough to kill a human being. The simplest way to go about such a thing would be to dissolve the plutonium in a source of drinking water, or prepare an explosion that would disperse plutonium dust in the air. If this happened in a major city, it would be uninhabitable for 24,000 years.

Norwegian Checks

Norwegian customs officials in Finnmark and Troms are now being trained in the use of technical equipment that will be capable of uncovering any attempts to smuggle radioactive material across the border in the north. This light, portable technical equipment has already been installed at customs posts. Information Officer Bjorn Sandnes of the Customs and Excise Directorate told AFTENPOSTEN. Customs officers are also carrying out thorough checks of Russian fishing vessels sailing into Norwegian ports.

Sandnes conceded that it could be difficult to uncover smuggling of these materials, which do not take up much room and are therefore difficult to find.

So far, the customs authorities have no reason to believe that attempts have been made to smuggle radioactive material into Norway, but they have tightened up their inspection procedures on the basis of developments in Russia. Norway and Russia have entered into an agreement on customs cooperation in the north, and there are frequent contacts with the customs authorities in Murmansk.

Possible Plutonium Smuggling Attempt Investigated

BR0709154794 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
6 Sept p 4

[Trond Boe report: "Plutonium Offer Being Investigated"]

[Text] Stavanger—A Norwegian woman supposedly has been offered plutonium for sale by an unknown man with a Russian-sounding name as she worked at a stand at the Oil Fair. The Stavanger section of the National Security Police, who are investigating the matter, refused to comment to AFTENPOSTEN on the woman's identity, or to say whether there might really have been plutonium in Stavanger during the fair or to provide any other information as long as the investigation is still underway.

There was only one Russian company in the metals sector which had a stand at the Oil Fair, but there was a large Russian delegation taking part in the conference. The security police would like to contact the person who made the "plutonium offer." The central bureau of the Security Police is also involved in the investigation.

Improbable?

"The incident sounds unreal at first, but we can not discount it on that basis. We intend to investigate and then draw our conclusions," says Acting Security Police Chief Per Gammelgaard, who does not know of any concrete incidents of plutonium being smuggled into Norway. There have been several claims and rumors of plutonium smuggling, but investigations have not uncovered any concrete evidence.

Gammelgaard does not exclude the possibility that the Oil Fair, with its many foreign visitors, was an arena for plutonium smuggling. However, his initial reaction is that it is not particularly professional to try and market radioactive material as openly as is supposed to have been done there.

According to recent reports in the British newspaper The Times, high-ranking Russian officials have repeatedly and completely openly offered plutonium and highly-radioactive uranium to British engineer John Large, who has been an advisor to the nuclear authorities in Russia.

"For the time being, there is no reason to fear that Norway is becoming a channel for smuggling radioactive material to countries in the west, but we are following developments closely," says Gammelgaard, referring to the seizures made in Germany recently. These developments mean that the Norwegian police must be especially alert. That is why the security police are routinely included in the investigation.

Three weeks ago, the Department of Justice issued a new directive for the Security Service which gives the control of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction high priority.

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Schmidbauer Stresses Importance of Cooperation With Moscow

AU2008134694 Munich ARD Television Network
in German 2030 GMT 19 Aug 94

[Interview with Minister of State in the Chancellor's Office Bernd Schmidbauer by Martin Schulze in Bonn studio; date not given—recorded]

[Text]

Schulze: Mr. Schmidbauer, during your trip to Moscow you will be confronted with accusations such as the one that Germany put passengers at risk by not seizing the plutonium before the plane departed from Moscow. What is your reaction?

Schmidbauer: I do not think that there will be any such accusations. I think the whole thing can be explained. You must bear in mind that the security authorities conducting this operation had good reasons for not disclosing this before leaving Moscow. There might have been participation by certain bodies, which would have made this operation impossible, endangered its successful completion. I do not think that these are real accusations. The point of the whole matter, which will also be discussed in Moscow, is cooperation.

Schulze: Another accusation has come from Deputy Nuclear Energy Minister Mikhirin [name as heard] who said that this is a provocation by the West in order to get hold of the Russian nuclear facilities out of sheer greed.

Schmidbauer: There has been no official accusation of that sort. Considering that a great number of such incidents have occurred all over Europe, just a few of which happened in the FRG, it becomes clear that this is just propaganda, from one side or the other. You can forget about that. That is not reality.

Schulze: Russian nuclear expert Chernosenko—he is the expert who was in charge of cleanup operations at Chernobyl—thinks that all efforts to stop nuclear smuggling are superfluous. He said there is so much nuclear material in Germany that all such efforts are pointless.

Schmidbauer: Over the past few days I have heard so many experts speak. I am not very sure about people pointing out things so clearly that turn out to be incorrect at second glance. What is correct is that there might be a large number of undetected cases. And we must make efforts to shed light on these cases. And what is important in this connection is cooperation, not presenting slogans to the media.

Schulze: What is the utmost that you can achieve in Moscow?

Schmidbauer: We will achieve what we have been discussing with Moscow all the time, namely that we must have much more contact on all levels, better cooperation, that we must discuss things much more openly. And we must concentrate all our efforts on preventing such material from reaching German territory. That is our aim.

Stepashin, Schmidbauer Discuss Nuclear Smuggling

LD2008180494 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1600 GMT 20 Aug 94

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text]

Correspondent A. Kondulakov: The West is taking the liberty of playing tough with us: First, there was the FBI director, who actively proposed fighting against our mafia and guarding our nuclear stocks. Now there is the scandal over weapons-grade plutonium allegedly of Russian origin. Russian nuclear workers and special services disown this assiduously. The genealogy of the confiscated plutonium still has to be proven, something which is incidentally virtually impossible without the cooperation of Russian scientists. Counter-intelligence spokesmen assert that "the entire scandal is a purely political affair, with the aim of putting our production of nuclear materials under the control of the western special services.

It is therefore no surprise that it is the nuclear problem which is the prime topic of the long-planned meeting between Sergey Stepashin, chairman of the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service, and Bernd Schmidbauer, coordinator of German intelligence services. Scientists and experts in nuclear power are represented on both the German and the Russian sides, as well as cloak and dagger knights.

A solid discussion is under way at the meeting. The Germans brought with them documents, showing the results of laboratory analysis of contraband plutonium. After these have been examined in detail, our scientists will give their conclusions. However, preliminary examination has already led them to doubt that it is of Russian origin—at our nuclear installations these substances have fundamentally different properties. Nevertheless, the Russian side is ready for cooperation, but not with regard to control over our nuclear facilities, but in investigating specific matters.

Aleksandr Mikhaylov, head of Public Relations Center of the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service: I think this cooperation should take the form of rapid investigation activities in order to jointly seek criminals dealing in these substances, and in exchanging information and conducting joint measures, not only with German, but also French and U.S. special services.

Stepashin, Schmidbauer Talks 'Constructive'

LD2208182194 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1520 GMT 22 Aug 94

[Article by ITAR-TASS correspondent Olga Semenova]

[Text] Moscow, 22 Aug—Three days of talks between Sergey Stepashin, member of Russia's Security Council and director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service, and Bernd Schmidbauer, minister of state in the Federal Chancellor's Office coordinating the activity of the German special services, ended in Moscow today with the

signing of a memorandum on cooperation between Germany and Russia in combatting the illegal trade in nuclear materials.

In their brief speeches before journalists, in whose presence both state officials attached their signatures to the Russian-German memorandum, Schmidbauer and Stepashin noted with satisfaction the friendly atmosphere of the talks and the constructive approach of both sides to discussing even the most difficult and delicate matters.

The memorandum contains a list of specific measures aimed at increasing bilateral cooperation. Its contents will be published in more detail after the federal chancellor and the Russian president have acquainted themselves with it.

For his part, Schmidbauer stressed that he will today inform Helmut Kohl of the results of the mission entrusted to him, which he considers successfully fulfilled. The head of the German delegation told a KRIM-TASS correspondent that the instructions given to him by the federal chancellor went beyond the bounds of discovering the origin of the plutonium confiscated at Munich airport by the Bavarian police.

"The main thing, and we achieved this," he stressed, "is the establishment of bilateral liaison at an operational level in the fight against the illegal traffic in nuclear materials."

Sergey Stepashin announced that the German side has presented certain evidence on the latest cases concerning uranium and plutonium, and a number of names have been handed over concerning which the Russian special services will act promptly on their own territory, while their German counterparts would carry out their part of the agreed measures.

Although the relevant agreements have existed since 1992, until the latest episodes with radioactive elements they have not, unfortunately, worked satisfactorily.

"But it is an ill wind that blows no one any good," the director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service pointed out. "The latest event has impelled both departments to undertake specific operational work."

Sergey Stepashin called on all states concerned to join in the bilateral cooperation between Germany and Russia in the struggle against the illicit traffic in nuclear materials (or as Bernd Schmidbauer graphically put it, against their dangerous uncontrolled "wandering" around Europe), making this cooperation multilateral.

During the talks, agreement was also reached on closer working cooperation in other fields: the fight against organized crime, certain types of economic crimes, and international terrorism.

In continuation of the specific work initiated, in the words of both figures, in the talks of 20-22 August in Moscow, the German side invited their Russian colleagues to come to Bonn in September-October this year.

Schmidbauer Says Russians 'Extremely Serious' About Plutonium

*AU2308090194 Munich ARD Television Network
in German 2038 GMT 22 Aug 94*

[Interview with State Minister Bernd Schmidbauer by Ulrich Wickert in Bonn—live]

[Text]

Wickert: What did Kohl write to Yeltsin?

Schmidbauer: The chancellor has had an intensive exchange of views with Boris Yeltsin over the past weeks and made it clear that the situation is difficult for all sides—for Russia, for Germany, for all of Europe—to find this vagrant material anywhere in the future and to thus discover the threat to the citizens in our country. It was an intensive, good exchange of views. In the end, the agreement that we concluded today was the result of this exchange of views.

Wickert: Did the chancellor exert pressure?

Schmidbauer: Certainly, both sides have realized and are convinced that this situation involves a very difficult matter, that this nuclear material is a challenge and an extreme threat for us all. This is a joint pressure, so to speak. I felt—and we were in permanent contact with the Russian president—that the will exists there to come to agreements, and not only on paper but the will to flesh out such agreements. We have already started to put the memorandum into practice.

Wickert: Before you went to Moscow, one heard some contemptuous comments from Russia. Do you take Russia's readiness seriously?

Schmidbauer: Mr. Wickert, the Russian side is extremely serious. The Russian side knows what the situation is in its country. It is aware of the potential of plutonium, of enriched uranium, of other radioactive materials on its territory, and it knows the threat that may arise from it. I myself and the entire delegation felt that they are not only serious but they are now starting to tackle the problem and are hoping for help—not only so that something is done jointly but so that something really happens in Russia.

Wickert: What do you mean by giving help?

Schmidbauer: Help in the sense of, for instance, having come to agreements on joint analyses. It will no longer be just one country making the analyses and interpreting them but this will be done jointly.

Wickert: But the Germans are not even technically able to make these analyses.

Schmidbauer: Well, all over the world there is hardly another institute like the one in Karlsruhe [the European Institute for Transuranic Elements]—state-of-the-art instruments, state-of-the-art scientific equipment, excellent scientists—this European institute is one of the best we have and this is also recognized in Russia.

Wickert: But why was it then not possible to find out that the plutonium that was seized in Munich was so impure that it simply could not have come from Russia?

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Schmidbauer: Well, as you say, there are many statements and what they are worth is shown every time experts talk to each other and scientists establish contact with each other. There are some open questions also with regard to this plutonium. First, it is very pure [as heard]; second, it is of weapons-grade quality; third, with some good will it is and must be possible to find out from where this material came to us. It has also been set down in the memorandum that the scientists will continue talking to each other, that some more tests will be made, that this material will be examined as to whether there is really an exact fingerprint. You can see from this memorandum that this is precisely what we intend in the near future. Furthermore, it is not so important to attribute blame in this matter but to work jointly on making this material disappear and stay where it is.

Wickert: Thank you very much, Mr. Schmidbauer.

Primakov, Schmidbauer Discuss Interaction

*LD2208102094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1013 GMT 22 Aug 94*

[Article by ITAR-TASS correspondent Olga Semenova]

[Text] Moscow August 22 TASS—Today's meeting between chief of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service Yevgeniy Primakov and the German chancellor's special envoy Bernd Schmidbauer held at the latter's request was devoted to questions not immediately related to the aim of Schmidbauer's visit to Moscow, according to Primakov's press secretary Tatyana Samolis.

Yevgeniy Primakov received the German visitor not so much as an envoy from the German chancellor entrusted with settling the so-called "plutonium incident", as the coordinator of the activity of German special services.

All participants in the meeting, including the leaders of German special services Konrad Porzner and Ekkard Wertebach, have a common interest in the non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons.

The meeting also discussed general questions concerning the nuclear arms control, but the conversation mainly focussed around prospects for interaction between the two countries' intelligence services.

Russia's chief spy had established good constructive relations with Konrad Porzner earlier, Samolis said. This is felt in the activity of their respective services in which elements of interaction have yielded practical results.

Stepashin-Schmidbauer Talks Fail To Resolve Plutonium Origin

*LD2308164694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0759 GMT 23 Aug 94*

[Article by ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 23 Aug—The atmosphere at the bilateral talks on the illegal international traffic in nuclear materials, which were held in Moscow from 20 to 22 August during the visit to the Russian capital by German Plenipotentiary Representative Bernd Schmidbauer, was described as friendly and constructive in a press release issued today by the German Embassy to the Russian

Federation. President Yeltsin authorized Sergey Stepashin, member of Russia's Security Council and director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FSK], to represent Russia at the talks with Schmidbauer, who is minister of state in the federal chancellor's office.

The two sides acknowledged that smuggling of nuclear materials poses a serious threat, no matter where it originates from. Therefore, it is essential to expand and intensify cooperation in preventing and putting a stop to criminal activities of this kind. Specific steps aimed at improving the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation in this area were set out in the memorandum signed by the two sides.

In addition to the talks held from 20 to 22 August with Sergey Stepashin, the coordinator of the German special services had a meeting on 22 August with Academician Yevgeniy Primakov, director of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service. According to Tatyana Samolis, press secretary to the head of the service, the talks were held at Schmidbauer's request and digressed slightly from the main purpose of his mission. The principal topic was "cooperation" for the common good between the two countries' intelligence services. ITAR-TASS was told by informed sources. Schmidbauer was also interested to hear the views of an influential Russian state official on many other "general political" issues, in the light of the forthcoming visit by President Yeltsin to Germany.

It was the common view of the participants in the talks and meetings, including the representatives of special services from both countries, that the visit was useful and timely in spite of the unfortunate background against which it took place (the German authorities discovered several consignments of weapons-grade plutonium which were allegedly manufactured in Russia) and the very unfriendly campaign in the western media. Direct working contacts were established on specific operational cases. This should lead to tangible results.

It was only the experts drawn into the talks on both sides who were not entirely happy. German scientific officials feel a certain embarrassment at the failure of their evidence to convince Russian colleagues. Our own specialists are indignant at the reluctance of politicians and journalists to heed their authoritative view that the plutonium samples do not come from Russian nuclear weapons. Yevgeniy Mikerin, head of the scientific and technical directorate responsible for nuclear and chemical matters at the Ministry of Atomic Energy, reiterated this point quite firmly in an interview with ITAR-TASS after the signing of the memorandum at the FSK.

Thus, Schmidbauer's visit was a success, but there has still been no official answer to the question of whose plutonium-239 was seized at Munich airport.

SPD Criticizes German-Russian Nuclear Smuggling Memorandum

*LD2308153794 Berlin DDP/ADN in German
1425 GMT 23 Aug 94*

[Excerpts] Bonn (DDP/ADN)—Chancellor Minister Friedrich Bohl sees the German-Russian memorandum on nuclear smuggling as considerable progress in the fight against nuclear crime. It is particularly important that the

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Russian side is clearly committed to cooperation in removing stray nuclear materials from the market, Bohl said on Deutschlandfunk radio today. Now additional steps had to be taken toward international cooperation against nuclear smuggling.

In addition, Karsten Voigt, foreign policy spokesman of the SPD [Social Democratic Party] Bundestag group, said the memorandum did not make clear how the government intended effectively to prevent nuclear smuggling in the future. In the memorandum were the "same general formulas and clichés" that the German Government had already used in the past to pacify people.

The uncertainty about the origin of the plutonium seized in the most recent smuggling case still continues. Bohl said there were indeed suspicions that the material came from Russia, but scientists had yet to clarify the matter. [passage omitted on Russian nuclear expert]

Meanwhile, the relevant authorities have rejected reports suggesting that the plutonium discoveries in Germany could be traced back to Iraq and the Basque terrorist organization ETA. [passage omitted]

BILD newspaper writes in its Wednesday edition that the 300 grams of plutonium found in Munich was for the ETA. It originates from the Russian nuclear plant Tomsk 7. Munich senior public prosecutor Veit Sauter told DDP/ADN, however, that the material was still being examined at the nuclear research unit in Karlsruhe to determine its origin.

Intensive Kohl-Yeltsin Talks Resulted in Moscow Memorandum

LD2208221894 Berlin DDP/ADN in German
2057 GMT 22 Aug 94

[Text] Hamburg (DDP/ADN)—According to Bernd Schmidbauer, head of the German delegation, the German-Russian memorandum agreed in Moscow today on the means to combat international nuclear smuggling is the result of an "intensive, good exchange of views" between Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the Russian President Boris Yeltsin over the last few weeks on the subject of tracking down stray nuclear material.

Pressure had been applied by both sides, State Minister Schmidbauer made clear on ARD's "Tagesthemen" this evening. They weren't aware of the Russian side's wish to find solutions. The Russian side was "extremely serious" about this, and it was also aware of the potential of the nuclear material in its country and the threat that it posed, Schmidbauer stressed. Moscow was also hoping for help from other countries, as exemplified in the current agreements on the common analysis of the seized nuclear material.

Schmidbauer admitted that there were still several open questions concerning the plutonium that was seized in Munich a short time ago. According to Schmidbauer, it is, contrary to other reports, very pure and of weapons-grade. It was not so much a matter of assigning blame but of finding ways to ensure it stays where it is.

Kinkel Urges CIS Nuclear States to Improve Nuclear Controls

LD1908135294 Almaty KAZTAG in Russian
1130 GMT 19 Aug 94

[Text] [No dateline as received]—The German foreign minister urged Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine to strengthen control over the production of nuclear material. Illegal trafficking in nuclear material can only be halted in the places of its production and storage. This was said by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. He appealed to the foreign ministers of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to contribute to the creation of comprehensive, efficient, and safe control over the production of nuclear materials.

Kinkel proposed to establish cooperation in this area with the European Union countries. He also stressed that the international community should exercise control over plutonium production as the next stage.

The German foreign minister stated that as chairman of the EU Council of Ministers he will propose for consideration by this body at its meeting on 10 September issues of illegal trafficking in nuclear materials and the need for urgent steps aimed at stopping the spread of this practice.

The minister spoke about the need for Europol and Euratom to combat the "nuclear mafia". The German foreign minister stressed the importance of Europol creating a common data bank on all cases of smuggling radioactive materials.

France, Russia to Cooperate in Nuclear Smuggling Prevention

BR2608140094 Paris PARIS MATCH in French 1 Sep 94 p 72
[Article by Francois Labrouillere: "Plutonium: French Come to Russia's Aid"]

[Text] France is to help Russia control its nuclear materials, in order to avoid a worrying traffic in plutonium which seems to have increased over recent months. In June, 10 members of the IPSN [Institute for Nuclear Protection and Safety] visited Moscow for initial contacts with their counterparts from Mimatom, the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry. In return, Russian specialists are due to visit the IPSN headquarters in Fontenay-aux-Roses later this autumn to learn how to keep precise inventories of nuclear materials and study all the available measuring methods. "To prevent traffic, the best way is still to prevent nuclear materials from leaving the nuclear site," explains Denis Flory, assistant manager at the IPSN's Radioactive Materials Security Department, who was a member of the mission to Russia and worked for three years at nuclear power stations in the former USSR.

In France, no traffic in nuclear materials has yet been detected. But the customs authorities are being very vigilant. A few months ago, customs officers took delivery of radiation detectors, made available to them courtesy of the CEA [Atomic Energy Commission]. They have also received training from the IPSN. However, French nuclear experts refuse to exaggerate the scale of the traffic discovered in Germany. "The quantities are ridiculously small and the plutonium seized is not of military quality. It rather seems to be a mix with uranium, destined for civilian fast-breeder reactors," explains Denis Flory.

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